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 “YOU CAN’T GET THERE FROM HERE?”: 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIMS IN 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS AFTER AEDPA 
GREGORY J. O‘MEARA, S.J.* 
One measure of a society is how it treats those with little power, those 
who have suffered from problems not of their own choosing.
1
  Surely victims 
of crime fit into this category, and society has not often given them what they 
desire and need.
2
  Though they garner far less sympathy, perpetrators of crime 
may also be vulnerable to forces beyond their control, including physical and 
mental disabilities, childhoods marked by abuse and neglect, and incompetent 
attorneys who fail to fulfill constitutionally mandated standards.
3
  The 
criminal justice system attempts to address deficiencies in the representation 
criminal defendants receive in part through its appellate process.  Following 
the exhaustion of state court postconviction review, prisoners in state custody 
can petition for relief in federal courts by applying for a writ of habeas 
corpus.
4
  Congress attempted to restrict access to federal courts for habeas 
relief with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
 
* Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School.  The author would like to thank 
Professors Daniel Blinka, Scott Moss, Peter Rofes, Paul Secunda, and the members of the Marquette 
University Law School Works in Progress Colloquium for their extraordinarily helpful comments.  
He also thanks participants at Marquette University Law School‘s Criminal Appeals: Past, Present, 
and Future Conference for their helpful suggestions.  I owe a further debt of gratitude to three 
different students who helped with the research on this Article: Mr. Jonathan Thiry, Mr. Bryan 
Bayer, and Mr. Michael Moeschberger.  Finally, thank you to the kind staff at the Marquette 
University Law Library, especially Ms. Julia Jaet, who graciously helped me hunt down sources.  
1. See, e.g., ENRIQUE DUSSEL, PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION 60 (Aquilina Martinez & Christine 
Morkovsky trans., Orbis Books 1990).   
2. See, e.g., CHARLES DOYLE, CRIME VICTIMS‘ RIGHTS ACT 3 (2008). 
3. This position that the system can serve the rights of both victims and criminals is not 
uncontroversial.  See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN 
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 137 (2004).  ―[A] senior U.S. Justice Department official . . . once told 
us, ‗People are either for victims or for criminals, . . . you‘re for criminals.‘  That forced choice is 
nonsense, but it was widely held to be necessary in the 1980s and early 1990s.‖   Id.  Most studies 
associate crime with poverty, and studies which draw different conclusions seem to suffer from 
methodological flaws.  For a broad exploration of crime statistics and their difficulties, see generally 
ROBERT REINER, LAW AND ORDER: AN HONEST CITIZEN‘S GUIDE TO CRIME AND CONTROL 44–116 
(2007).   
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006) provides that ―application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it 
appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . .‖  Id. 
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(AEDPA).
5
  This Article explores how representative federal courts have 
responded to that legislation. 
AEDPA‘s limitations on habeas relief for state prisoners6 have been quite 
successful in some ways;
7
 nevertheless, petitioners claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel have met with more success in circuit and district courts 
than anticipated.  Despite AEDPA, courts have expanded Strickland v. 
Washington‘s holding beyond an honest reading of the original case.8  This 
expansion, I argue, is not unrelated to AEDPA itself.  First, AEDPA ignores 
that the writ of habeas corpus is rooted not only in statute but also in the text 
of the Constitution itself.  Second, AEDPA‘s drafters assumed that case 
precedent binds lower courts as statutory law does; therefore, they believed 
AEDPA would confer greater authority upon Supreme Court precedent than 
these cases already possess.  It does not.  These problems with the original 
legislation have led federal courts, including the Supreme Court, to expand 
the class of successful petitioners who claim ineffective assistance of counsel. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Habeas review for state prisoners is currently seen as an exercise in 
futility.
9
  This conclusion emerges out of appellate counsel‘s wrestling with 
 
5. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–108, 
110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (1996).   
6. ―Section 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA tightly circumscribes grants of habeas relief to a limited set 
of state court decisions . . . .‖  Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act “Clearly Established 
Law” in Habeas Review: Carey v. Musladin, 121 HARV. L. REV. 335, 335 (2007) [hereinafter 
Clearly Established Law].  For a general analysis of AEDPA, see Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the 
New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996).  
7. See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 279 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(―In AEDPA, Congress work[ed] substantial changes to the power of federal courts to grant habeas 
corpus relief.‖) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).  But see Larry W. Yackle, 
State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate , 91 CORNELL L. REV. 
541, 547 (2006). 
[With the passage of AEDPA,] the Court might have used the occasion 
provided by new legislation to shape things into a more sensible form—
integrating new statutory provisions into existing decisional law, identifying and 
reconciling discernible rationales, and blending everything together into a more 
coherent system.  That has not happened. . . .  AEDPA is replete with tensions 
that defy resolution through pragmatic judicial construction.   
Id.  
8. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (setting out affirmative standards for 
determining if counsel‘s representation is effective within the requirements of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel for criminal defendants).   
9. As Professor Stephen Vladeck observes:  
More than a dozen times in the past five Terms, the Supreme Court has 
reversed an appellate court‘s decision granting postconviction habeas relief to a 
state prisoner: not because it concluded that the state court had acted correctly, 
but because the state court‘s error was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 
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the roadblocks AEDPA erected to limit federal review.
10
  Even before the 
passage of AEDPA, the Supreme Court severely limited petitioners‘ access to 
federal courts.
11
  Anecdotally, appellate attorneys have mentioned that, 
because petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus is a losing proposition, their 
time is better spent elsewhere. 
This Article challenges the belief that defendants cannot prevail in habeas 
actions; although few prisoners successfully petition for the writ, recent 
federal circuit court cases addressing ineffective assistance of counsel indicate 
there may be more life in this body of law than is commonly thought.
12
  After 
briefly describing the procedural posture in which the writ of habeas corpus 
for state prisoners arises, the Article shows how AEDPA‘s requirement of 
deferential review restricts habeas access.  The Article then considers two 
mistaken assumptions that underlie AEDPA‘s analytical framework: first, the 
 
application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme 
Court, which is the standard of review prescribed by the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).   
Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional 
Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 595 (2009) (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 
(2008) (per curiam); Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 
(2007); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006); Kane v. Garcia 
Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005) (per curiam); Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005); Brown v. Payton, 
544 U.S. 133 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005) (per curiam); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 
649 (2004) (per curiam); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 
U.S. 433 (2004) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (per curiam); Yarborough v. 
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) (per curiam)).   
10. The specific limitations on access have been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006), which 
provides as follows: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 
the adjudication of the claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State 
court proceeding. 
Id.  In this Article, when I refer to AEDPA, I am usually referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).   
11. See, e.g., John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 
262 (2006); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act , 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 
4–5 (1997); Yackle, supra note 7, at 544, 547. 
12. Even though few petitioners are successful in applying for the writ, the impact of habeas 
cases on criminal procedure cannot be overstated.  Most of the major Supreme Court precedent 
expanding or contracting what we now know as the constitutional aspects of the criminal justice 
system arose in habeas cases.  Even though these cases seem statistically insignificant, they acquire a 
symbolic value as they act as a lodestar, guiding courts and counsel about what constitutes 
constitutionally significant arguments before the courts.   
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writ of habeas corpus rests not only on statutory but also on constitutional 
grounds, which limits how far AEDPA‘s restrictions can go, and second, 
AEDPA ignores that case precedent binds differently from statutory law. 
With the foregoing as prologue, I turn to the substantive case law of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the Strickland line of cases.  After briefly 
predicting how post-AEDPA cases should be decided based on a fair read of 
Strickland, the Article examines more recent decisions of the circuit courts.  
Representative cases reveal that courts have insisted that defense attorneys do 
far more than Strickland required to be found effective.  In so ruling, federal 
courts uphold their rightful place as interpreters of the Constitution and as 
protectors of defendants‘ rights. 
As a final preliminary matter, petitioners subject to the death penalty 
constitute most of the successful applicants for the writ in the cases that 
follow.
13
  Because habeas petitioners are not granted counsel as a matter of 
constitutional right, they must represent themselves, pay for counsel, or rely 
on attorneys who act pro bono or are appointed by the district court.
14
  Thus, 
paradoxically, those facing the death penalty may be in a better position to 
have their rights vindicated in federal court than those not subject to capital 
punishment.  Presumably, a number of state prisoners sentenced to life or less 
time in prison have also suffered constitutionally infirm representation.  
However, these petitioners‘ meritorious claims may go unheard because their 
 
13. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. MELLO, DEAD WRONG: A DEATH ROW LAWYER SPEAKS OUT 
AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 137–38 (1997).  
[T]he success rate of noncapital habeas petitions is low, with estimates ranging 
from 0.25 percent to 3.2 percent to 7 percent.  The success rate in capital habeas 
is much higher, however: 70 percent as of 1983, 60 percent as of 1986, and 40 
percent as of today.  Between 1976 and 1983 federal appellate courts ruled in 
favor of the condemned inmate in 73.2 percent of the capital habeas appeals 
heard, compared with only 6.5 percent of the decisions in noncapital habeas 
cases.   
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see Richards v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 553, 558, 572 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming the district court‘s granting of the writ in a non-death penalty case).   
14. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority, explained:  
We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel 
when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions, and we decline to so 
hold today.  Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to 
the first appeal of right, and no further.  Thus, we have rejected suggestions that 
we establish a right to counsel on discretionary appeals. We think that since a 
defendant has no federal constitutional right to counsel when pursuing a 
discretionary appeal on direct review of his conviction, a fortiori, he has no 
such right when attacking a conviction that has long since become final upon 
exhaustion of the appellate process.        
Id. (citations omitted).  
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assigned punishment does not provide free representation.
15
  Perhaps the most 
important ―difference‖ in capital punishment is better access to attorneys for 
habeas review.
16
  Thus, while capital defendants may find a hearing despite 
AEDPA‘s restrictions, other defendants may not, leaving AEDPA‘s 
restrictions important, even if not consistently enforced. 
II.  PROCEDURAL POSTURE: HOW HABEAS WORKS 
A.  Who Can Petition for a Writ 
Most criminal cases arise in state jurisdictions rather than in the federal 
system.
17
  Therefore, most ineffective assistance claims come from state court 
proceedings.  Although ineffectiveness claims are ordinarily grounded in the 
Sixth Amendment,
18
 such claims could also rest on an independent state 
ground guaranteed by a state‘s constitution.19  The independent state ground 
for relief must guarantee at least what the federal Constitution guarantees, but 
it could hold state criminal courts and counsel to a higher standard.
20
  The 
 
15. Id.  
16. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286, 289 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(―Death is a unique punishment . . . .  [D]eath . . . is in a class by itself.‖); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (―[P]enalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree 
but in kind.‖). 
17. YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 18 (12th ed. 2008)  (―[W]hen the 
federal system is compared to the state systems as a group, the combined state systems clearly 
dominate, as they account for a much larger portion of the nation‘s criminal justice workload (e.g., 
roughly 96% of all felony prosecutions and over 99% of all misdemeanor prosecutions).‖). 
18. The entire amendment provides that 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
19. See, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (―[T]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall 
not be suspended unless, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.‖).  See also 
WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007–2008). 
20. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hager v. Marten, 594 N.W.2d 791 (Wis. 1999).  The petitioner 
applied to the state trial court for habeas relief on the ground that the state failed to comply with state 
statutes governing inpatient competency examinations.  Id. at 794.  He argued that the failure to 
follow the statute was a jurisdictional defect in his continuing confinement and required dismissal of 
his criminal complaint.  Id. at 795.  In ruling on the matter, the court observed that ―[i]n a habeas 
corpus action, we apply a de novo standard to issues of law . . . .‖  Id.  The de novo standard of 
review is more favorable to petitioners than is the deferential standard laid out in AEDPA.  See infra 
notes 56–60 and accompanying text.  This holding illustrates how state laws can be more protective 
of petitioner‘s rights than is required by the federal Constitution.  But, if a prisoner relies solely on 
state law, he cannot have recourse to the federal courts if the state decision goes against him.    
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prisoner raising only state law questions can appeal only to the highest courts 
within her state.
21
 
However, if a prisoner in state custody alleges she is held in violation of 
the United States Constitution, a final decision by the highest state court need 
not be the end of the road.  When state appeals have been exhausted,
22
 a 
prisoner who believes her conviction was obtained in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution has a right to petition federal courts for release from custody 
through the writ of habeas corpus.
23
  This petition is a collateral attack on the 
state conviction, alleging it was obtained in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution.
24
 
B.  Habeas Filings Increase, but They Do Not Overwhelm Federal Courts 
Before the 1950s, the Supreme Court rarely intervened in state 
convictions.
25
  The Court‘s willingness to consider these claims grew out of 
rising political sensitivity stemming in part from the civil rights movement; 
one commentator notes: 
After World War II, however . . . [m]any critics, particularly 
members of the civil rights movement, saw state judiciaries as 
insensitive to defendants‘ constitutional rights and demanded 
more extensive federal oversight of criminal law.  In its 1953 
decision Brown v. Allen, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded 
the system of federal habeas corpus to provide such 
 
21. See generally LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 1–13 (1981 & Supp. 
2008); see, e.g., Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 92 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that where the state court 
makes a finding prohibiting collateral review ―on an adequate and independent state procedural 
ground,‖ the matter cannot be reviewed by a federal court on federal constitutional grounds).  
22. The issue of just what constitutes exhaustion for purposes of habeas law is beyond the 
scope of this Article, though it has garnered enormous attention in recent years.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006) provides that application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted unless it appears that ―the 
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.‖  Id.  Nevertheless, ―[a]n 
application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of 
the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.‖  Id. § 2254(b)(2).  A good 
and brief overview of this topic appears in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & 
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER‘S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
1443–46 (4th ed. 1996).   
23. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426–27 (1963); see 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006), noting 
that a court may ―set the judgment aside and . . . discharge the prisoner . . . .‖  The best overview of 
how the writ of habeas corpus applies to state court prisoners appears in YACKLE, supra note 21, 
§§ 17–21.   
24. The word ―collateral‖ in this context means that the remedy ―provide[s] an avenue for 
upsetting judgments that have become otherwise final.‖  Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 
682–83 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).   
25. See Blume, supra note 11, at 262–64.  ―Brown v. Allen and its three subsequent decisions 
establish[] the highwater mark of habeas . . . .‖  Id. at 262–63. 
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supervision.
26
 
After the Brown ruling, federal courts became more willing to entertain 
claims that state convictions rested on unconstitutional grounds.
27
  For 
example, in Rogers v. Richmond, the Court found a confession to be 
involuntary when it emerged from a detective‘s threat to transport a 
petitioner‘s invalid wife to the police station for questioning.28  Similarly, the 
Court reversed a conviction where interrogators told a woman that if she did 
not ―cooperate,‖ her children would be taken from her, and she would be 
deprived of state financial aid.
29
  Although state courts upheld these and 
similar practices, federal courts condemned them on constitutional grounds. 
Reaction to the expanded reach of habeas review was mixed.  Some 
perceived the expansion unfavorably.
30
  Simmering under the surface was a 
 
26. Sharad Sushil Khandelwal, Note, The Path to Habeas Corpus Narrows: Interpreting 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 96 MICH. L. REV. 434, 434 (1997) (footnotes omitted). 
27. See id. at 435. 
28. 365 U.S. 534, 536, 545 (1961). 
29. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).  For further illustrations, the Court set out 
more egregious practices related to obtaining confessions in Miranda v. Arizona:   
In addition, see People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953); Wakat v. 
Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (C.A. 7th Cir. 1958) (defendant suffering from broken 
bones, multiple bruises and injuries sufficiently serious to require eight months‘ 
medical treatment after being manhandled by five policemen); Kier v. State, 213 
Md. 556, 132 A.2d 494 (1957) (police doctor told accused, who was strapped to 
a chair completely nude, that he proposed to take hair and skin scrapings from 
anything that looked like blood or sperm from various parts of his body); 
Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P.2d 111 (1945) (defendant held in 
custody over two months, deprived of food for 15 hours, forced to submit to a 
lie detector test when he wanted to go to the toilet); People v. Matlock, 51 
Cal. 2d 682, 336 P.2d 505 (1959) (defendant questioned incessantly over an 
evening‘s time, made to lie on cold board and to answer quest ions whenever it 
appeared he was getting sleepy).  Other cases are documented in American 
Civil Liberties Union, Illinois Division, Secret Detention by the Chicago Police 
(1959); Potts, The Preliminary Examination and ―The Third Degree,‖ 2 Baylor 
L. Rev. 131 (1950); Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of 
Confession, 14 J. Pub. L. 25 (1965). 
384 U.S. 436, 446–47 n.7 (1966). 
30. See, e.g., Khandelwal, supra note 26, at 436.  
Victims and their families found habeas corpus a torturous process, prolonging 
their agony by adding another layer of ―appeals‖ to an already overburdened 
criminal justice system.  It also led to inefficient expenditures of courts‘ time 
and attention, with federal judges facing towering stacks of barely legible 
handwritten petitions, very few of which were likely to raise valid constitutional 
claims.  
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?—A Comment on 
Recent Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665, 1666 (1990) 
(―Many, therefore, have come to regard the Great Writ as a slap in the face of federalism.‖). 
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sense that federal courts usurped the legitimate authority of the states.  Justice 
Frankfurter‘s admonition that ―the District Judge [must] decide constitutional 
questions presented by a State prisoner even after his claims have been 
carefully considered by the State courts‖31 illustrated what opponents of 
expanded habeas review feared most: a black-robed ―Big Brother‖ looking 
over their collective shoulders.  On the other hand, the recognition of 
petitioners‘ constitutional claims exercised a long-desired check on state 
judges who placed too high a value on political expediency and too low a 
value on rights of criminal defendants.
32
 
Those opposing the expanded availability of habeas review asserted that 
federal courts were drowning in a sea of frivolous claims because federal 
judges misunderstood both the realities of state criminal practice and the 
proper use of habeas corpus.
33
  Prisoners did file habeas petitions more 
frequently after Brown v. Allen; however, even twenty years ago, the late 
Professor Frank Remington sagely noted that habeas actions were not 
overburdening federal courts.
34
 Indeed, ―the limited enthusiasm displayed 
over the elimination of federal court diversity jurisdiction‖ indicated that not 
all believed that the claims of efficiency were paramount.
35
  Remington 
concluded that ―limiting the access of state prisoners to federal habeas corpus 
is likely to have only a minor effect on the case load of federal courts.‖36  
 
31. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
32. Blume, supra note 11, at 263–64.   
33. See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2332 (1993) 
(―Over a career spanning forty years, Chief Justice Rehnquist has been witness to, or has participated 
in, numerous efforts to import preclusion into the law of habeas corpus . . . .‖); see also Blume, supra 
note 11, at 265–69, where Professor John H. Blume shows how the Court consistently restricted 
habeas appeals.  ―In each of these decisions, the majority focused on the interests of comity, 
federalism, and finality—interests it believed prior habeas jurisprudence had significantly 
undervalued.‖  Id. at 269 (footnotes omitted).    
34. Frank J. Remington, Restricting Access to Federal Habeas Corpus: Justice Sacrificed on 
the Altars of Expediency, Federalism and Deterrence, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339, 346 
(1987–1988).  
[T]he major increase in cases filed by state prisoners in federal courts is not in 
habeas cases but rather in conditions-of-confinement cases brought by state 
prisoners.  For example, while the number of habeas cases handled by federal 
magistrates increased from 4208 to 7184 during the decade starting in 1977, 
state prisoner conditions-of-confinement cases increased from 2778 to 
17,229 . . . .  Nonetheless, proposals to alleviate the case load burden on the 
federal courts continue to focus on habeas corpus petitions[,] . . . raising strong 
doubts as to the sincerity of the reformers‘ purported primary concern with the 
federal courts‘ case load.  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
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Current scholarship supports Remington‘s predictions.37  Professor Blume 
recently calculated that the intervention of federal courts into state convictions 
is rare;
38
 only 0.62% of federal habeas petitions are successful.
39
 
Habeas claims continue to occupy only a relatively small part of the 
federal docket.  For example in June 2008, there were 1,409,422 inmates in 
state prisons;
40
 they filed a total of 21,490 habeas petitions.
41
  The total 
number of civil suits commenced in federal courts in 2008 was 267,257.
42
  
Thus, habeas cases were 8% of that total.
43
  Personal injury and contract 
actions take up a significantly greater share of federal courts‘ calendars, and 
these suits do not necessarily raise issues of constitutional rights.
44
  Further, 
state criminal cases reach federal court not only through prisoners‘ petitions 
but also through appeals by state prosecutors who challenge state court 
decisions on federal constitutional issues.
45
  Remington maintained that if 
there were a difficulty with state sovereignty being set aside in these cases, the 
difficulty lay not with prisoners but with prosecutors.
46
  The foregoing helps 
place any discussion of access to habeas review in a broader context. 
III.  THE BACKLASH AGAINST HABEAS: AEDPA AND THE COURTS 
Limitations on habeas review began not with AEDPA‘s provisions but 
with Supreme Court decisions under the leadership of Justices Harlan, Burger, 
Powell, and Rehnquist.
47
  In Wainwright v. Sykes the Court acknowledged its 
 
37. Professor Blume crunches the numbers in his article, which downplays the effects of 
AEDPA.  ―[G]iven the increase in the number of incarcerated persons, the actual number of petitions 
filed per 1,000 inmates has decreased.‖  Blume, supra note 11, at 283 n.117.  Thus, the increase in 
the number of filings is less than would have been predicted given the greater number of prisoners in 
the pool and may reveal that federal courts are reluctant to overturn state convictions.   
38. Blume calculates the success rate of § 2254 cases as averaging 0.62% in the years between 
1997 and 2004.  Id. at 284 tbl.4. 
39. Id.  
40. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF 
JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008, at 2 (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
pim08st.pdf. 
41. JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2008 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 147 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/appendices/ 
C02ASep08.pdf. 
42. Id. at 146. 
43. See id.  
44. See id.  
45. Remington, supra note 34, at 348. 
46. Id.  
47. Blume, supra note 11, at 265; see also Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 11, at 3.  Professors 
Tushnet and Yackle maintain that these statutes enacted after ―substantial judicial reconstruction of 
the law‖ were ―largely symbolic.‖  Id.  That is to say that these statutes really added nothing of 
substance to what the courts had already done.  Thus, ―[p]risoners and their advocates will not see the 
AEDPA and [Prison Litigation Reform Act] as desirable statutes on the whole, but they will not find 
them insuperable barriers either.‖  Id. at 84.  Although a relatively adequate discussion of Supreme 
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―willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, 
even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained 
unchanged.‖48  Commentators largely agree that congressional efforts to limit 
habeas review—including AEDPA—were largely ―symbolic‖ or unnecessary 
because the Court‘s own actions beat Congress to the punch.49 
Despite repeated analyses that habeas review was already constricted by 
courts before the passage of AEDPA,
50
 courts and practitioners usually 
reference AEDPA when describing how habeas review is restricted.
51
  Thus, it 
is instructive to consider the key provision governing access to federal courts, 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
52
  Before AEDPA, the Court applied a 
de novo standard of review to: (1) legal questions in which the petitioner 
attacked the rule that the trial court used in the underlying case, and (2) mixed 
questions of fact and law in which the petitioner challenged how the trial 
court applied the law to the particular facts of her case.
53
  Thus, the only cases 
in which federal courts deferred to state court findings were questions of fact 
determined by the trial court, presumably because trial judges were better able 
to make determinations of credibility of the witnesses.
54
  AEDPA changed the 
law by requiring state prisoners to meet strict prerequisites before federal 
 
Court precedent limiting access to habeas courts is beyond the scope of this Article, a clean 
discussion appears in A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New Rules” and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4–15 (2002).  In 
particular, Professor Bryant sketches out the roots of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and its 
progeny.  Id.  Justice Harlan‘s objections to expanding habeas jurisdiction are set forth eloquently in 
his concurrence to Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 681–95 (1971). 
48. 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977). 
49. See Blume, supra note 11, at 297; Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 11, at 3. 
50. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 11, at 297; Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 11, at 3; Yackle, 
supra note 7, at 547. 
51. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–
108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (1996). 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006) provides as follows: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 
the adjudication of the claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding. 
Id. 
53. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506–07 (1953). 
54. Id. at 506. 
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courts can consider the merits of their petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
55
  
The statute raises the level of deference due state court decisions by reviewing 
federal judges.
56
   
The strength of the writ of habeas corpus depends in large part on how 
easily petitioners can get into court.
57
  AEDPA seemed to make access to 
federal court difficult.
58
  Under AEDPA, state court proceedings will not be 
disturbed unless they rest on ―a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States‖ or a decision that was based on an 
―unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
 
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  
56. Although this provision is usually characterized as defining ―standards of review,‖ not all 
commentators agree that this phrasing describes the situation with precision.  See, e.g., Evan Tsen 
Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated) User’s Manual, 51 VAND. L.  
REV. 103, 107 (1998). 
In colloquial terms, then, the new section 2254(d) prescribes ―standards of 
review‖—that is, the standards by which federal habeas courts are to review 
state court judgments.  As a formal matter, this terminology is of dubious 
validity; federal habeas corpus has always been classed as an original 
proceeding whose function was to test the legality of a prisoner‘s custody 
simpliciter.  Federal habeas courts never formally reviewed state court 
convictions in the way that appellate courts review trial court judgments.  
Habeas corpus proceedings were collateral to judgments of conviction . . . . 
[Nevertheless,] the new section 2254(d) governs the standard of review to be 
employed in habeas proceedings in much the way that Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) governs the standard of federal appellate review of federal 
district court decisions. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
57. Khandelwal, supra note 26, at 435.  
If a federal court reviews a state judgment under a de novo standard of review, 
it can grant a writ of habeas corpus whenever it simply disagrees with a state 
court‘s constitutional interpretation.  Alternatively, a deferential standard of 
review greatly reduces the reach of a federal court‘s authority, as a federal court 
may issue the writ only when it finds the state court‘s decision unreasonable—
not merely when it disagrees with that decision.   
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
58. But see Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the Federal Habeas Statute: Is It Beyond 
Reason?, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 283 (2004). 
The world of federal habeas corpus continues to be dominated by issues 
arising from Congress‘s passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (―AEDPA‖).  One of AEDPA‘s most notable innovations 
was § 2254(d), which effectively requires federal habeas courts to accord state 
court criminal convictions a sort of deference.  The problem is that § 2254(d) is 
unusually ambiguous with respect to how much and what sort of deference is 
owed, and under what circumstances.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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the State court proceeding.‖59  In Williams v. Taylor, the Court instructed that 
the ―clearly established Federal law‖ prong was the threshold question.60  In 
that same case, Justice O‘Connor observed that clearly established federal law 
―refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta‖ of Supreme Court decisions.61  
In finding that law is clearly established, the Court does not demand a narrow 
holding directly on point; a state court‘s decision could be ―contrary to‖ or 
―an unreasonable application of‖ Supreme Court precedent by ignoring the 
―fundamental principles‖ established by the Court‘s most relevant 
precedents.
62
 
Finally, with regard to the unreasonable application of the clearly 
established federal law prong, the Court recognizes a distinction between 
rulings that bind lower courts with specificity and those whose analytical 
framework is looser.  In Yarborough v. Alvarado, the Court observed that the 
―range of reasonable judgment‖ depends on the rule upon which it relies.63  
Where the legal rule is specific, ―[a]pplications of the rule may be plainly 
correct or incorrect.‖64  By contrast, ―[o]ther rules are more general, and their 
meaning must emerge in application over the course of time.‖65  The Court 
maintains that general rules call for more deference to lower court decisions 
 
59. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).   
60. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000).  Some commentary questioned if the Court 
simply excised the ―unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the 
State Court proceeding‖ prong sub silentio in Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006), wherein the 
Court vacated and remanded a circuit court ruling granting the petitioner habeas relief.  Id. at 77; see 
Clearly Established Law, supra note 6, at 337.  The Court based the Musladin decision solely on the 
―clearly established federal law‖ prong and never mentioned the ―unreasonable determination of the 
facts‖ prong.  Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77; see Clearly Established Law, supra note 6, at 337.  Recent 
Supreme Court cases undermine this thesis.  See, e.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478 
(2007) (ruling that ―it was not objectively unreasonable for that court to conclude that a defendant 
who refused to allow the presentation of any mitigating evidence could not establish Strickland 
prejudice based on his counsel‘s failure to investigate further possible mitigating evidence‖ seems to 
rest on the ―unreasonable determination of the facts‖ prong).    
61. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  In his concurrence to Carey v. Musladin, Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice 
O‘Connor‘s ―dictum about dicta,‖ which he understood as ―represent[ing] an incorrect interpretation 
of the statute‘s text.‖  549 U.S. at 79. 
62. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 258 (2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).  But 
see Chief Justice Roberts‘s dissent: ―We give ourselves far too much credit in claiming that our 
sharply divided, ebbing and flowing decisions in this area gave rise to ‗clearly established‘ federal 
law.‖  Id. at 266 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see, e.g., Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171 (2010), in 
which the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, held that there was no ―clearly established‖ law 
for purposes of a habeas challenge holding that a judge reviewing a Batson objection must 
―personally observe[] and recall[]‖ the ―prospective juror‘s demeanor on which the explanation [for 
striking the juror] is based.‖  Id. at 1172. 
63. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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because they necessarily encompass a wider range of appropriate actions 
applying the precedent in question.
66
 
The Fifth Circuit expresses the common understanding of how AEDPA‘s 
language should be interpreted.
67
 
An application of federal law is unreasonable only when 
―reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one 
view that the state court ruling was incorrect.‖ . . .  Thus, 
AEDPA‘s standard of review both restricts the federal habeas 
court‘s review of state factual determinations, and interjects 
certain limitations upon the federal habeas court‘s review of 
legal conclusions that were not present under pre-AEDPA 
law.
68
 
IV.  PROBLEMS WITH AEDPA MAY REINVIGORATE A MORIBUND  
BODY OF LAW 
A.  AEDPA’s Roots in the “Contract with America” 
As Professors Tushnet and Yackle note, AEDPA was a direct descendant 
of proposals in the 1994 Republican Contract with America‘s ―Taking Back 
Our Streets Act.‖69  The legislation passed through Congress with little 
discussion.
70
  Following the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City, Congress rode the wave of populist outrage directed at 
perceived threats from domestic terrorism.
71
  Congressional leaders ―seized 
 
66. Id.  The logic of this ―specific rule versus general rule‖ distinction may go further and 
undermine the possibility of finding clearly established federal law in the first place.  See, e.g., 
Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 266 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Whether a rule is characterized as a general 
rule that calls for more deference to lower court determinations or as failing to constitute clearly 
established federal law, the result is similar: the petitioner will not prevail in his application for a writ 
of habeas corpus.  See id. 
67. Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 603 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 
173, 181 (5th Cir. 1999)).  
68. Id.  
69. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 11, at 20–21.  Arguing that ―most petitions are totally 
lacking in merit,‖ that  
―thousands upon thousands of frivolous petitions clog the federal district court 
dockets each year,‖ and that ―prisoners on death row [could] almost indefinitely 
delay their punishment,‖ the Contract‘s authors sought to impose a one-year 
deadline for filing habeas corpus claims generally, and a more stringent six-
month deadline for capital cases. 
Id. (quoting CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY 
AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 44 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).  
70. Yackle, supra note 7, at 545–48, 551–53.   
71. Id. at 545–46. 
The drafting work fell to staff lawyers serving the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  Those drafters did not simply select a prior bill as their model.  Nor 
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the opportunity finally to limit federal courts‘ authority in habeas corpus . . . 
in ordinary cases in which prisoners use habeas to challenge criminal 
convictions or sentences.‖72  The haste and underlying political agenda 
resulted in Professor Yackle‘s assessment that habeas corpus for state 
prisoners is an ―intellectual disaster area.‖73  In a similar vein, Justice Souter 
observed in Lindh v. Murphy, ―[a]ll we can say is that in a world of silk purses 
and pigs‘ ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting.‖74 
AEDPA‘s drafters made two unsupported assumptions that this Article 
will develop below.  Initially, they ignored the historical roots of habeas 
corpus; in so doing, they assumed that habeas jurisdiction is granted solely by 
statute.  This assumption is disputed by legal historians and courts.  Secondly, 
the drafters misperceived how statutory law and case precedent differ as 
binding authority.  These two difficulties give weight to Professor Yackle‘s 
observation that AEDPA is conceptually flawed.
75
  An understanding of these 
assumptions may provide petitioners and their attorneys with new tools to 
challenge state court convictions or sentences.
76
 
B.  The Right to Habeas Corpus Is Both Constitutional and Statutory 
As a general observation, it matters if the source of a given right is 
constitutional or statutory.  Two different sources have been cited as 
grounding the federal courts‘ power to issue the writ of habeas corpus.77  
 
did they start afresh.  The occasion was ripe for anything, and they emptied the 
committee files of virtually all the restrictive . . . procedural requirements that 
Republicans had tried to impose on all convicts . . . .  The bill shot through 
committee in both bodies and went to the floor without an explanatory report.  
The floor debates were extensive, but scarcely rigorous.  The bill was adopted 
by main force, and President Clinton signed it into law (though perhaps 
dubitante).  
Id. at 546 (footnote omitted).   
72. Id. at 546.  
73. Id. at 553 (footnote omitted).  
74. 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). 
75. See Yackle, supra note 7, at 548.  ―The manner in which AEDPA was cobbled together 
suggests that no one thought any of this through at a conceptual level.‖  Id.  The two observations 
discussed in this Article can be seen as further examples of the AEDPA‘s conceptual inadequacies to 
which Professor Yackle refers.   
76. See CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 13 (2007) (―[A]ll beliefs are held within a context 
or framework of the taken-for-granted, which usually remains tacit, and may even be as yet 
unacknowledged by the agent, because never formulated.‖).  Id.  The next section of this Article tries 
to explore the frameworks that operated beneath the surface of the drafters‘ work and indicates how 
difficulties with those assumptions undermine the stated goals of the law they drafted.   
77. YACKLE, supra note 21, at 77; Professor Peter J. Smith‘s important recent article, 
Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883 (2008), observes how textualists on the 
Court limit access to courts despite expansive grants of jurisdiction laid out in congressional statutes.  
Smith indicates that the textualists‘ urge to constrain judicial power may trump their competing 
demands to act as faithful agents of Congress who should focus merely on the plain meaning of the 
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Ordinarily, authorities cite the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its amendments, 
which derive power from Article III of the Constitution.
78
  As a result, federal 
habeas jurisdiction is seen as statutory and thus a matter of congressional 
control.
79  
In accord with that view, the Supreme Court has noted that 
jurisdiction to challenge state and federal judgments comes from 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.
80
 
Appreciation of this statutory basis for habeas jurisdiction is necessary, 
but it is not sufficient.  Justice Black cautioned against efforts to restrict 
access to habeas review: ―Habeas corpus, as an instrument to protect against 
illegal imprisonment, is written into the Constitution.  Its use by courts 
cannot . . . be constitutionally abridged by Executive or by Congress.‖81 
Black‘s statement rests in part upon the reference to the writ of habeas 
corpus in the Suspension Clause, which reads: ―The Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.‖82  Likewise, Professor LaFave 
 
jurisdictional statutes as written.  Id. at 1947–48.  Though his concerns are strictly beyond the scope 
of this study, Smith‘s indication that Justices may not be motivated by considerations beyond that of 
the text alone is surely germane to this Article.    
78. YACKLE, supra note 21, at 77. 
79. Id. 
80. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children‘s Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 509 n.9 (1982).  This 
reading gains support from no less an authority than Chief Justice Marshall, who seemed to assert it 
in Aaron Burr‘s conspiracy case, Ex parte Bollman, in which Marshall said that federal power to 
grant the writ ―must be given by written law,‖ 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807), and commentators 
agree that in context he meant statutory law, YACKLE, supra note 21, at 77 (citing Bollman, 8 U.S. 
(4 Cranch) at 94).  Marshall‘s opinion has come under attack.  Professor Francis Paschal argues that 
modern courts should read the Suspension Clause as ―a directive to all superior courts of record, state 
as well as federal, to make the habeas privilege routinely available.‖  Francis Paschal, The 
Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 607.  Paschal observed that Chief Justice 
Marshall held in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that Article III of the 
Constitution exhausted the possibilities of original jurisdiction for the federal courts.  Id. at 626.  
Paschal maintains that in Marbury, ―Marshall had simply forgotten the habeas corpus clause . . . .‖  
Paschal, supra, at 651.  The weight of current scholarship accepts Professor Paschal‘s view.  See, 
e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn’t 
Make It So: Ex parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789 (pt. 1), 51 ALA. L. REV. 531 (2000); see also James E. 
Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals , 78 
TEX. L. REV. 1433 (2000).      
81. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 798 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).  More recently, 
Justice Blackmun noted a number of problems with the law of federal habeas corpus, which he 
described as ―a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the 
vindication of federal rights.‖  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
82. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2; see generally Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The 
Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications , 94 VA. L. REV. 575 
(2008).  Professors Halliday and White maintain that the Suspension Clause extends the applicability 
of the writ much more broadly than is presently thought.  See id. at 713.  Indeed, they argue that the 
historical record ―suggests that, ‗at a minimum‘ the writ of habeas, in 1789, was taken as extending 
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underscores this line of authority: 
[The Suspension Clause] suggests that federal courts have the 
inherent authority to issue the writ in the absence of a valid 
suspension.  Such a reading would establish, in effect, a 
constitutional right to habeas relief, at least to the extent such 
relief was available at common law, for persons held in 
custody.
83
 
In dictum, the Court has noted that jurisdictional statutes ―implement[] the 
constitutional command that the writ of habeas corpus be made available.‖84  
There is no indication AEDPA‘s drafters appreciated the Court‘s recognition 
of a constitutional basis for habeas review, and the Supreme Court in its first 
AEDPA case noted that even if AEDPA can restrict habeas claims, the 
constitutional basis for habeas at least preserves the Supreme Court‘s own 
power to grant habeas petitions.
85
  The Court so held unanimously in Felker v. 
Turpin,
86
 finding the AEDPA habeas restrictions permissible in part because 
the Supreme Court retains its own habeas power under the text of the 
Constitution.
87
 
If courts continue to accept Justice Black‘s contention that granting the 
writ is rooted in the Constitution, they should also accept at least one 
important corollary: insofar as habeas review is a constitutional matter, access 
to courts should be analyzed in terms of the fundamental rights granted 
criminal defendants, including the right to a fair trial.  In Estes v. Texas, the 
Supreme Court announced that the right to a fair trial is the most fundamental 
right of criminal defendants.
88
  To secure this right, a number of ancillary 
rights must be enforced.  For example, freedom of the press may be impeded 
 
to natural subjects or citizens and resident aliens in British and American territory.‖  Id.  They then 
tease out implications of this finding, raising a number of questions about the sort of review that 
should be granted prisoners at Guantanamo.  Id. at 714.  If the Suspension Clause is seen as 
demanding expanded review for non-citizen prisoners at an offshore military prison, it may likewise 
demand expanded review for citizen prisoners held here in the U.S.  See also Robert D. Sloane, 
AEDPA’s “Adjudication on the Merits” Requirement: Collateral Review, Federalism, and  Comity, 
78 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 615, 624–28 (2004). 
83. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.2, 
at 1293 (3d ed. 2000). 
84. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963).  See Halliday & White, supra note 82, at 
578 n.2.  ―[T]he Supreme Court has never squarely held that ‗the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus‘ amounts to an affirmative constitutional right to habeas review.  It came perilously close to 
doing so in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301, 304 (2001), but stopped short.‖  Id. 
85. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996).  
86. Id.  
87. See Scott Moss, Recent Developments, An Appeal by Any Other Name: Congress’s Empty 
Victory over Habeas Rights—Felker v. Turpin, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 249, 252 (1997). 
88. 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). 
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to avoid contaminating a jury pool before trial.
89
  Defendants have the right to 
discover exculpatory evidence held by the prosecution.
90
  Finally, indigent 
defendants are guaranteed the right to government-provided attorneys to assist 
in their defense for both felony and misdemeanor charges.
91
 
Because the authority for habeas relief is at least unclear, and both 
historical evidence and Supreme Court authority root habeas corpus in the 
Constitution itself,
92
 courts may consider expanding jurisdiction in some cases 
beyond the narrow grants of statute.  At the very least, where the violation 
affects a petitioner‘s right to fair trial, there are strong reasons for expanding 
federal court jurisdiction to cases thought untouchable because of AEDPA‘s 
restrictions. 
C.  AEDPA Assumes Precedent Binds as Statutory Authority Does; It Doesn’t 
Another resource for reinvigorating access to habeas review relies less on 
constitutional history and more on the jurisprudential claims undergirding 
AEDPA.  Supreme Court cases construing AEDPA limit ―clearly established 
Federal law‖ to ―the holdings . . . of [the Supreme] Court‘s decisions as of the 
time of the relevant state-court decision.‖93  Although there is some 
disagreement, even within the Court, about how ―clearly established . . . at the 
time‖ should be parsed,94 the Justices agree that the ―clearly established‖ 
language is designed to restrict the ability of courts to review cases brought by 
state court petitioners.
95
  Justice Scalia has observed that the law cannot 
change via the grant of the petition.
96
  The reviewing court—including the 
 
89. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).   
90. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 
(1963). 
91. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–
40 (1963).    
92. See Halliday & White, supra note 82, at 575. 
93. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (O‘Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the 
Court with respect to Part II, concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment). 
94. Justice Scalia defines the legal requirement as limiting precedent that can be cited to that 
which is ―‗clearly established‘ . . . at the time of the [lower court] decision.‖  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  By contrast, Justice O‘Connor maintains in the majority 
opinion that it is sufficient that the prior case merely be before the Court on habeas review.  
―Contrary to the dissent‘s contention, we therefore made no new law in resolving Williams‘ 
ineffectiveness claim.‖  Id. at 522 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 543.  As indicated below, only gradually has the Court moved away from Justice 
Scalia‘s characterization of the law as ―unable to change.‖  As noted above, in Yarborough v. 
Alvarado, the Court noted that some rules require narrow application because of their specificity 
while others display more play in the joints.  541 U.S 652, 664 (2004).  This past term, Justice 
Thomas identified the Strickland standard as being a ―general standard‖ that grants state courts ―even 
more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.‖  Knowles v. 
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Supreme Court—must apply the law as it has been previously determined by 
the Supreme Court.
97
 
But what does it mean to say that case precedent cannot change?  The 
answer is far from clear.  It is easiest to approach this subject obliquely by 
distinguishing between statutory interpretation and the interpretation of 
precedent.  The clarity of statutory authority makes it uniquely attractive as a 
source of law.
98
  It is no accident that Justice Scalia‘s textualist approach finds 
a congenial home in statutory interpretation.
99
  Law in this vein is best 
understood through the lens of Sutherland: Statutes and Statutory 
Construction and is rooted in a series of assumptions of how law works.
100
  
Namely, words and phrases have a fixed meaning,
101
 and therefore, the 
interpreter can apply the canons of construction relatively easily.
102
  Law 
 
Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009).    
97. Williams, 529 U.S at 412. 
98. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14 
(13th ed. 1946). 
Where does the judge find the law which he embodies in his judgment?  There 
are times when the source is obvious.  The rule that fits the case may be 
supplied by the constitution or by statute.  If that is so, the judge looks no 
farther.  The correspondence ascertained, his duty is to obey.  The constitution 
overrides a statute, but a statute, if consistent with the constitution, overrides the 
law of judges.  In this sense, judge-made law is secondary and subordinate to 
the law that is made by legislators. 
Id.  
99. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(1997).   
But though I have no quarrel with the common law and its process, I do 
question whether the attitude of the common-law judge—the mind-set that asks, 
―What is the most desirable resolution of this case, and how can any 
impediments to the achievement of that result be evaded?‖—is appropriate for 
most of the work that I do, and much of the work that state judges do.  We live 
in an age of legislation, and most new law is statutory law.  As one legal 
historian has put it, in modern times ―the main business of government, and 
therefore of law, [is] legislative and executive. . . .  Even private law, so-called, 
[has been] turning statutory.  
Id. at 13.  
100. See generally NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND: STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (Thomson West 7th ed. 2008) (1891).  Despite Justice Scalia‘s 
commendation of SUTHERLAND: STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, the current edition 
questions Scalia‘s approach to statutory construction.  See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain 
Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction , in 3 SINGER & SINGER 
§ 65A:10, at 717–59, supra.   
101. See, e.g., 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 100, § 46:1, at 137.   
102. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 99, at 25–29; see generally 3 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 
100, §§ 57:1–57:26, at 2–98 (laying out the rules for mandatory and directory construction).  But see 
Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, in 3 SINGER & 
SINGER, supra note 100, § 65A:6, at 663–76.  Judge Posner does not directly mention Scalia‘s work, 
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under a statutory model is understood as a collection of rules stated with 
clarity and designed to apply universally within a given jurisdiction.
103
  
Further, statutory law is understood as applying in the same way at all times 
until it is repealed.
104
  The deeper implication is that unless the statute is 
inartfully drafted, there cannot be disagreement about what the law is or what 
it entails; those who differ in interpreting an unambiguous statute are either 
dishonest, self-deluded, or dull.
105
 
Although textualism is a popular approach to statutory interpretation, 
matters are perforce different when interpreting case law or constitutional 
precedent.
106
  As Professor Duxbury observes, case precedent, in contrast to 
statutory authority, is a disfavored source for law because the rule can be 
 
but he develops his argument based on the premise attacked directly by Scalia. 
The usual criticism of the canons, forcefully advanced by Professor 
Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a 
point there is an equal and opposite canon, so that the outcome of the 
interpretive process depends on the choice between paired opposites—a choice 
the canons themselves do not illuminate.    
Id. at 663. 
103. This view is subject to critique in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994): 
The ―ORIGINAL INTENT‖ and ―plain meaning‖ rhetoric in American statutory 
interpretation scholarship and decisions treats statutes as static texts and 
assumes that the meaning of a statute is fixed from the date of enactment.  The 
implication is that a legislator interpreting the statute at the time of enactment 
would—or should—render the same interpretation as an agency or judge 
interpreting the same statute fifty years later.  This is a dubious description of 
practical reality, and a dreary aspiration for our polity.  These dubieties suggest 
that we might also doubt the assumptions embedded within the originalist 
rhetoric of statutory interpretation.  
Id. at 9 (typeface in original). 
104. Id.  
105. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE 8 (1986).  This approach is best described by 
Professor Dworkin in his rendering of the ―plain fact‖ theory of the law: 
Most laymen assume that there is law in the books decisive of every issue that 
might come before a judge.  The academic version of the plain-fact view denies 
this.  The law may be silent on the issue in play, it insists, because no past 
institutional decision speaks to it either way.   
Id. 
106. Carleton Kemp Allen, Precedent and Logic, 41 L. Q. REV. 329, 334 (1925). 
The ‗binding force‘ of precedents has, through constant and often unthinking 
repetition, become a kind of sacramental phrase which contains a large element 
of fiction.  If a Court is quite clear about the rule of law which should be applied 
to the case before it, it will seldom allow itself to be embarrassed by an 
inconvenient decision.  There are many ways of ‗distinguishing,‘ and a bad case 
. . . is soon distinguished out of existence. 
Id. 
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difficult to understand, difficult to derive, and difficult to demarcate around 
the edges.
107
  Professor Schauer maintains that when dealing with case law, 
we are dealing not with binding rules as we are with statutes; rather, we are 
dealing with authority to be followed.
108
  Courts redraw and re-conceive 
categories set out by earlier precedent.
109
  These categorical distinctions in 
 
107. NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 92 (2008). 
The casual nature of judicial precedents—the fact that judges are generally 
free to say as much or as little as they like, the likelihood that there will be no 
canonical form of words capturing the ratio decidendi of a case, the difficulty of 
determining in many instances just what is the ratio decidendi as opposed to 
obiter dicta—means that they are not particularly efficient vessels for 
conveying important legal information.  
Id. at 92; see also Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 891–92 
(2006).  Professor Schauer sets out the challenge thusly:   
I mean to pose a skeptical challenge to one pervasive argument for the common 
law and against its alternatives.  And that argument is that one reason (and not 
necessarily the only reason, and not necessarily the best reason) to prefer the 
common law is that rulemaking and lawmaking are better done when the 
rulemaker has before her a live controversy, a controversy that enables her to 
see all of the real world implications of making one rule rather than another.  
When there is no actual dispute, so the argument goes, everything is 
speculation, and speculation that is not rooted in real world events is especially 
likely to be misguided.   
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
At the end of his analysis, Professor Schauer offers the following conclusion: ―Yet when we 
combine the lessons of at least one strand of Legal Realism with some of the lessons of modern 
social science, we see as well that real events, real parties, real controversies, and real consequences 
may have distorting effects as well as illuminating ones.‖  Id. at 918.  Schauer suggests that case law 
may thus come to decisions that are not in the best interests of society and should be treated with 
wariness by courts and counsel.  Id.    
108. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 591–92 (1987). 
Because the constraint of precedent might not be an all-or-nothing affair, 
we must consider the way in which the size of the categories of assimilation 
might largely determine the strength of precedent.  This is admittedly an odd 
way of thinking about weight, because it is more common to think of the 
question of size and the question of strength as lying along different axes.  But 
when we turn to precedent this distinction between size and strength collapses.   
It might occur to us to say that precedent provides one reason for a 
particular decision without providing a conclusive reason.  
Id. (footnote omitted).   
109. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 98, at 112–13.  
[I]n the main there shall be adherence to precedent.  There shall be symmetrical 
development, consistently with history or custom when history or custom has 
been the motive force, or the chief one, in giving shape to existing rules, and 
with logic or philosophy when the motive power has been theirs.  But 
symmetrical development may be bought at too high a price.  Uniformity ceases 
to be a good when it becomes uniformity of oppression.  The social interest 
served by symmetry or certainty must then be balanced against the social 
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turn emphasize or subordinate earlier holdings and affect how relevant earlier 
cases are to the case at hand.
110
  Schauer, among others, indicates that there is 
no way to correct for this fluctuation in meaning; therefore, precedent cannot 
provide conclusive guidance as a source of law.
111
 
Although the many distinctions between statutory law and case precedent 
as sources of legal authority are beyond the scope of this Article, one 
difference helps explain why AEDPA cannot work as some courts have 
claimed.  Professors Jonsen and Toulmin observe that one virtue of the case 
method is its ability to manage conflicts that general propositional rules 
cannot address.
112
  In particular, the case method recognizes the virtue of 
indeterminacy, leaving certain questions undertheorized or incompletely 
explored to gain agreement from a wide spectrum of viewpoints.
113
  As 
Professor Sunstein notes, parties may agree on particular conclusions or broad 
ideas of justice, even if they do not employ the same chains of reasoning in 
precisely the same way.
114
 
 
interest served by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare.  These 
may enjoin upon the judge the duty of drawing the line at another angle, of 
staking the path along new courses, of marking a new point of departure from 
which others who come after him will set out upon their journey.   
Id.   
110. Id. 
111. Schauer, supra note 108, at 591–92. 
112. ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF 
MORAL REASONING 9 (1988). 
In morality, as in law and public administration, the assumption that all 
practical decisions need to rest on a sufficiently clear and general system of 
invariable rules or principles has, from a theoretical point of view, a certain 
attractiveness.  But in the actual business of dealing with particular real-life 
cases and situations, such rules and principles can never takes us more than part 
of the way.  The real-life application of moral, legal, and administrative rules 
calls always for the exercise of human perceptiveness and discernment—what 
has traditionally been referred to as ―equity‖—and the more problematic the 
situations become, the greater is the need for such discernment.  
Id.  
113. Id. at 314.   
The heart of moral experience does not lie in a mastery of general rules and 
theoretical principles, however sound and well reasoned those principles may 
appear.  It is located, rather, in the wisdom that comes from seeing how the 
ideas behind those rules work out in the course of people‘s lives: in particular, 
seeing more exactly what is involved in insisting on (or waiving) this or that 
rule in one or another set of circumstances.  Only experience of this kind will 
give individual agents the practical priorities that they need in weighing moral 
considerations of different kinds and resolving conflicts between those different 
considerations.   
Id.; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35–61 (1996).  
114. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 35.   
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This incomplete theorization enhances social cohesion by permitting 
agreement on broad principles, and it opens legal reasoning to broader sorts of 
concerns—and perhaps less elegant formulation—than argument based on 
propositional rules permits.
115
  Case law thus enhances agreement among 
different parties for what may be different reasons; it has more ―play in the 
joints‖ than does statutory law.  Professor Duxbury notes how this openness 
leads to development of law: 
If judges were bound by precedents much as they are bound 
by statutes, the opportunities for judge-made law to evolve 
would be considerably limited; but if precedents had 
absolutely no capacity to constrain, there would be no point 
to the doctrine of stare decisis.  The idea of precedents having 
authority is meant to capture the fact that the truth lies 
somewhere between these two extremes, that the law that 
courts create is the law they often feel obligated and are 
obligated to follow.
116
 
Judge-made law can and does evolve and change; this adaptability is one of 
its strengths. 
Precedent thus provides not a binding rule but a departure point for judges 
contemplating similar sets of facts.
117
  Professor Duxbury suggests that 
 
Incompletely theorized agreements play a pervasive role in law and society.  It 
is quite rare for a person or group completely to theorize any subject, that is, to 
accept both a general theory and a series of steps connecting that theory to 
concrete conclusions.  Thus we often have in law an incompletely theorized 
agreement on a general principle—incompletely theorized in the sense that 
people who accept the principle need not agree on what it entails in particular 
cases. 
Id.  
115. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 112, at 299. 
Some philosophers, such as Henry Sidgwick, find practical ethics messy or 
untidy and welcome the formal elegance of an [sic] nicely framed ethical 
analysis.  Sidgwick‘s preference was neither eccentric nor transitory: quite 
recently, in a similar spirit we find Jonathan Glover complaining about the 
―baroque complexity‖ of practical morals . . . .  But this aesthetic preference 
operates only on an intellectual level.  If we allow our passion for simplicity and 
elegance to affect our moral decisions in practice, we risk errors in moral 
judgment . . . . 
Id. (endnote omitted). 
116. DUXBURY, supra note 107, at 23–24.  
117. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 98, at 19–20. 
The first thing [a judge confronting a new case] does is to compare the 
case before him with the precedents, whether stored in his mind or hidden in the 
books.  I do not mean that precedents are ultimate sources of the law, supplying 
the sole equipment that is needed for the legal armory . . . .  Back of precedents 
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precedent is helpfully understood as providing the framework for future 
decision making.
118
  Justice Cardozo suggests an accretion model in which 
new cases build on the frameworks set out in older cases.
119
  H.L.A. Hart 
maintains that what gives the legal system intelligibility is that judges in fact 
do follow precedent.
120
  But just what different jurists mean when they claim 
to follow precedent is unsettled.
121
 
Because case law develops and binds in ways different from statutory law, 
cases governed by AEDPA are not strictly tied to prior authority because of 
the odd way the statute is structured.  Rather than attempting to codify the 
 
are the basic juridical conceptions which are the postulates of judicial reasoning, 
and farther back are the habits of life, the institutions of society, in which those 
conceptions had their origin, and which, by a process of interaction, they have 
modified in turn.  None the less, in a system so highly developed as our own, 
precedents have so covered the ground that they fix the point of departure from 
which the labor of the judge begins.  Almost invariably, his first step is to 
examine and compare them.  If they are plain and to the point, there may be 
need of nothing more.  Stare decisis is at least the everyday working rule of our 
law. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
118. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 107, at 94. 
Precedents, on this account, resemble what cognitive theorists term 
availability heuristics.  When decision-makers recognize that their capacity to 
obtain and assimilate information is limited, they tend to devise procedures and 
mechanisms which establish a link between a body of existing information they 
might confidently use and the decisions they have to make.  
Id. (footnotes omitted).   
119. CARDOZO, supra note 98, at 48. 
These fundamental conceptions once attained form the starting point from 
which are derived new consequences, which, at first tentative and groping, gain 
by reiteration a new permanence and certainty.  In the end, they become 
accepted themselves as fundamental and axiomatic.  So it is with the growth 
from precedent to precedent.  The implications of a decision may in the 
beginning be equivocal.  New cases by commentary and exposition extract the 
essence.  At last there emerges a rule or principle which becomes a datum, a 
point of departure, from which new lines will be run . . . . 
Id. 
120. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 131 (1961).  The difficulty for Hart is determining 
just what following precedent means.  From his perspective, judges perform different actions when 
they claim to follow precedent.   
The acknowledgement of precedent as a criterion of legal validity means 
different things in different systems, and in the same system at different times.  
Descriptions of the English ‗theory‘ of precedent are, on certain points, still 
highly contentious: indeed, even the key terms used in the theory, ‗ratio 
decidendi‘, ‗material facts‘, ‗interpretation‘, have their own penumbra of 
uncertainty.   
Id.  
121. Id. 
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holdings of earlier cases, AEDPA simply points to prior Supreme Court cases 
as extrinsic objects and refers courts to them as sources of authority, 
ostensibly suggesting that by so doing, they impose a requirement of strict 
interpretation of earlier precedent.
122
  Because the announced authority, 
Supreme Court cases, are simply judge-made law, and because legal rules 
stemming from cases are necessarily revisable in a way that congressionally 
enacted or statutory law is not, AEDPA fails to bind later courts as a statute 
codifying prior case law would.  Despite its stated purpose, AEDPA does not 
impart some ―super-precedential power‖ on earlier cases.  This conclusion is 
borne out by examining how Strickland has been interpreted by federal courts. 
V.  FIRST CRACK AT INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: STRICKLAND 
A.  The Court Vaguely Defines Ineffective Assistance  
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to an attorney, 
although the substance of that right continues to evolve.
123
  In McMann v. 
Richardson, the Court recognized that ―the right to counsel is the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.‖124  Not until Strickland v. Washington did the 
Court flesh out important contours of this right.
125
  Although earlier cases stated 
that counsel must be ―effective,‖ the Court‘s pre-Strickland decisions considered 
only affirmative governmental interference with representation rather than 
addressing the substance of a defense attorney‘s actions or omissions.126 
The Strickland rule is addressed to ―whether counsel‘s conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.‖127  The Court extended 
this standard to capital sentencing hearings as well because they are 
―sufficiently like a trial in . . . adversarial format and in the existence of 
 
122. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  To be fair, 
the statute itself does not make these claims; however, that certainly is the interpretation textualists 
impart to it.  See id.    
123. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence. 
Id. 
124. 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (citations omitted).  
125. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).  ―The Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the 
constitutional requirement of effective assistance in . . . those [cases] presenting claims of ‗actual 
ineffectiveness.‘‖  Id.  
126. Id.  
127. Id. 
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standards for decision.‖128  Strickland‘s holding is commonly expressed as a 
two-part test.  The first prong requires that the defendant prove that trial 
counsel‘s performance was deficient.129  Second, the defendant must prove 
that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
130
  The vague test for 
the deficient performance prong is whether counsel‘s representation fell 
below ―objective standard[s] of reasonableness.‖131  The performance prong is 
evaluated using law and standards from the time of the trial or sentencing 
itself.
132
  By contrast, the prejudice prong is evaluated using law that exists at 
the time of the ineffectiveness challenge.
133
  This prong can be found where 
there is a ―reasonable probability‖ that the result of the proceeding would 
have been different, but for counsel‘s error.134 
This two-part test is contextualized by an admonition that reviewing 
courts indulge a strong presumption in favor of counsel‘s effectiveness.135  
Therefore, the Court directed: 
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‘s 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel‘s perspective at the time.  Because of the difficulties 
inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
 
128. Id.  
129. Id. at 687. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 688.  To prove deficiency, the Court stated that The Defense Function, ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) (current version at ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-1.1 to 
4-8.6 (3d ed. 1993)), is a guide to determining what is reasonable.  Nevertheless, ―[no] particular set 
of detailed rules for counsel‘s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances 
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a 
criminal defendant.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89.  Justice O‘Connor observed, ―More specific 
guidelines are not appropriate.‖  Id. at 688.  Despite that assertion, the wide range of findings of what 
does or does not constitute deficiency in the lower courts indicates that lower courts would have 
appreciated some guidance here.  See infra Part VI.   
132. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89. 
133. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 371 (1993). 
134. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
135. Id. at 689.  
Judicial scrutiny of counsel‘s performance must be highly deferential.  It is 
all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel‘s assistance after 
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining 
counsel‘s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular 
act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.   
Id.   
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defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action ―might be considered 
sound trial strategy.‖136 
As might be expected on the basis of this presumption, following the 
decision Strickland served more to limit the pool of litigants than expand it.
137
  
Anecdotally, Strickland was referred to as establishing ―the breathing 
standard.‖  So long as counsel drew breath and sat next to her client without 
doing anything aggressively stupid, the representation passed constitutional 
muster. 
B.  Rules Without Facts Are Ambiguous and May Be Misleading 
The Strickland rule as presented above ignores the facts that anchored the 
original decision.  That position is untenable if one wishes to chart how the 
law has changed.
138
  One oversimplified way of thinking of the interaction of 
law and facts is to think of a given rule of law as a filter.  By announcing the 
rule of law, a court thereby identifies certain sorts of facts as relevant and 
other facts as irrelevant.
139
  For example, the crime of burglary occurs when a 
 
136. Id. 
137. See, e.g., Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001).  ―The Strickland standard 
is rigorous, and the great majority of habeas petitions that allege constitutionally ineffective counsel 
founder on that standard.‖  Id.   
138. Indeed, one strategy for ignoring inconvenient precedent is simply to cite abstract legal 
rules in the absence of any factual grounding.  Rather than tying these propositions to concrete 
situations, the judge acts as though law is made up of idealized, atemporal, and necessary 
propositions.  Professors Jonsen and Toulmin demonstrate that this sort of reasoning is simply 
irrelevant in practical fields such as medicine, law, or ethics:  
[P]ractical fields such as law, medicine, and public administration deal with 
concrete actual cases, not with abstract idealized situations.  They are directly 
concerned with immediate facts about specific situations and individuals: 
general ideas concern them only indirectly, as they bear on the problems of 
those particular individuals.  Unlike natural scientists, who are free to decide in 
advance which types of situations, cases, or individuals they may (or need not) 
pay attention to, physicians, lawyers, and social service workers face myriad 
professional problems the moment any client walks through the door. . . .  
[T]hey cannot choose to ignore them or their problems. 
JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 112, at 31.   
 Thus, to separate legal rules from the facts that ground them is to act as though law were a 
theoretical field like geometry, which proceeds along this idealized, atemporal, and necessary sort of 
reasoning.  This sort of reasoning applied to law is at best mistaken.  Professors Jonsen and Toulmin 
observe:   
[I]f we fight off this bewitchment by the dream of an ethical algorithm—a 
universal and invariable code of procedures capable of providing unique and 
definitive answers to all our moral questions—it quickly becomes clear that 
even the best set of rules or principles cannot by itself satisfy our expectations.   
Id. at 7.  
139. See, e.g., Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 
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perpetrator enters the dwelling of another with the intent to steal or to commit 
a felony therein.
140
  Whether the place illegally entered is owned rather than 
rented is not relevant to the question: ―Did a burglary occur?‖  Therefore, if 
someone is applying the rule of the law of burglary correctly, the distinction 
made between one who owns and one who rents the affected property will be 
filtered out; it simply does not figure into determining if a burglary happened.  
If the distinction between renting and owning a dwelling becomes legally 
important, then one is no longer dealing with the same law of burglary; once 
this distinction becomes important, one has shifted to a different legal 
category. 
This relationship between facts and law may be expressed in two abstract 
corollary presumptions that derive from the above example.  When facts of 
sort X which were once vital to determining the outcome of law A, are no 
longer considered when courts apply law A, we can say that law A has 
changed.  Similarly, when facts of sort Y, which were once irrelevant to 
determination of law B, become the linchpin of the argument for the 
application and decision by courts applying law B, we can say that law B has 
changed.  These presumptions do not tell us what the law is at a given time, 
but they do indicate a way of determining if a given law has changed. 
The Court underscored this relationship between facts and law in Williams 
 
161, 169 (1930). 
The same set of facts may look entirely different to two different persons.  The 
judge founds his conclusions upon a group of facts selected by him as material 
from among a larger mass of facts, some of which might seem significant to a 
layman, but which, to a lawyer, are irrelevant.  The judge, therefore, reaches a 
conclusion upon the facts as he sees them.  It is on these facts that he bases his 
judgment, and not on any others.  It follows that our task in analyzing a case is 
not to state the facts and the conclusion, but to state the material facts as seen by 
the judge and his conclusion based on them.  It is by his choice of the material 
facts that the judge creates law.  A congeries of facts is presented to him; he 
chooses those which he considers material and rejects those which are 
immaterial, and then bases his conclusion upon the material ones.  To ignore his 
choice is to miss the whole point of the case.  Our system of precedent becomes 
meaningless if we say that we will accept his conclusion but not his view of the 
facts.  His conclusion is based on the material facts as he sees them, and we 
cannot add or subtract from them by proving that other facts existed in the case.  
Id.  
140. MODEL PENAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES § 221.1 (1985).   
(1) Burglary Defined.  A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building 
or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with 
purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to 
the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.  It is an affirmative 
defense to prosecution for burglary that the building or structure was 
abandoned.   
Id.   
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v. Taylor, the first major post-AEDPA case to interpret Strickland.
141
  The 
Williams Court attempted to define what Congress meant by its use of the 
language, ―unreasonable application of . . . clearly established federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court.‖142  An ―unreasonable application‖ of 
Supreme Court precedent occurs when ―a state court confronts facts that are 
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and 
arrives at a result opposite to [that precedent].‖143  Or to put it in the abstract: 
when facts of sort Y occur, a lower court applies the law ―unreasonably‖ when 
it arrives at a conclusion different from the Supreme Court when it 
encountered facts of sort Y.  The cases below demonstrate that this standard 
has not been applied consistently. 
It is difficult to chart changes in the law because the relationship between 
facts and law is neither stable nor static; facts condition and refine legal norms 
that are under consideration as a matter of course.  The French philosopher 
Paul Ricoeur described this mutual conditioning: 
The application of a rule is in fact a very complex operation 
where the interpretation of the facts and the interpretation of 
the norm mutually condition each other, before ending in the 
qualification by which it is said that some allegedly criminal 
behavior falls under such and such a norm which is said to 
have been violated.  If we begin with the interpretation of the 
facts, we cannot overemphasize the multitude of ways a set of 
interconnected facts can be considered and, let us say, 
recounted.  .  .  .  We never finish untangling the lines of the 
personal story of an accused with certainty, and even reading 
it in such a way is already oriented by the presumption that 
such an interconnectedness places the case under some rule.  
To say that a is a case of B is already to decide that the 
juridical syllogism holds for it.
144
 
Relevant legal categories are determined by the interplay among 
constitutions, statutes, administrative rules, and case precedent on the one 
hand and the facts that ground a particular dispute on the other.
145
  As 
 
141. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). 
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
143. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. 
144. PAUL RICOEUR, LE JUSTE (1995), translated in THE JUST 121 (David Pellauer trans., 
Univ. of Chicago Press 2000). 
145. See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, SHIKUL DAAT SHIPUTY (1987), translated in JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION 17 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., Yale Univ. Press 1989) (1987). 
The distinction among the three objects of judicial discretion is blurred.  The 
difficulty is inherent in the fact that we do not have accurate instruments for 
determining what constitutes a fact and what a norm, and where the border 
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Professor Aharon Barak notes, the categories of fact and the legal norms 
applied to those facts remain porous and permeable.
146
  Law and fact 
condition and illuminate each other such that they cannot easily be 
separated.
147
 
C.  Strickland Changed Lower Court Rulings by Ignoring Facts 
Justice O‘Connor‘s decision in Strickland ignored lower courts‘ specific 
findings of fact that grounded their conclusion that Washington received 
constitutionally ineffective representation.
148
  The lower courts noted that he 
came from a home marked by violence, abuse, and incest.
149
  His murders 
were extraordinarily grisly and sexual.
150
  All involved stabbings or shootings 
at point blank range that would have covered the defendant in copious 
amounts of blood.
151
  Two stabbings occurred while the victims were in 
bed.
152
 In the first, the victim was presumably unclothed.
153
 In the third 
killing, the defendant stabbed the victim—who was bound to the bed and 
gagged throughout—so that the victim bled to death on the defendant‘s own 
mattress.
154
  The defendant engaged in this behavior in the course of twelve 
days with no previous indication of sexually violent tendencies.
155
  By 
excising these facts from her decision, Justice O‘Connor removed the lower 
courts‘ reasons for the finding that Washington was psychologically unstable, 
the key to lower courts‘ rulings that his attorney‘s representation was 
 
between them lies.  Moreover, the judge cannot decide the facts before he 
formulates for himself, if only at first glance, a view of the law, since the 
number of facts is infinite and he must focus only on those that are relevant, 
which is determined by the law.  Yet the judge cannot determine the law before 
he takes, again if only as a first impression, a stand regarding the facts, since the 
number of laws is great and he must concentrate on the law that applies, which 
is determined by the nature of the facts.  There exists, then, an intimate link 
between norm and fact.  
Id.  
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. For a fuller explanation of judicial fact-finding by the Strickland Court, see Gregory J. 
O‘Meara, S.J., The Name Is the Same, but the Facts Have Been Changed to Protect the Attorneys: 
Strickland, Judicial Discretion, and Appellate Decision-Making, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 687 (2008).   
149. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1266 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).  David 
Washington came from a ―broken and violent home, one marked by extensive child abuse and 
incest.‖  Id.  
150. See Washington v. Florida, 362 So. 2d 658, 660–61 (Fla. 1978), for an extended 
description of the crimes David Washington committed in a twelve-day period.  
151. Id.  
152. Id.  
153. Id. at 660.  
154. Id. at 661. 
155. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). 
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constitutionally defective. 
Without these facts found by lower courts, the reader of Strickland is not 
particularly disturbed when she learns that, in preparation for sentencing, the 
attorney spoke with the defendant but never met Washington‘s wife or 
mother.
156
  He did not seek other character witnesses to bolster Washington‘s 
case, nor did he request a psychiatric examination, ―since his conversations 
with his client gave no indication that [Washington] had psychological 
problems.‖157  Because of counsel‘s own sense of hopelessness about 
overcoming the defendant‘s subsequent confession to additional crimes, 
counsel decided not to put on further evidence about Washington‘s character 
and emotional state at the capital sentencing hearing.
158
  Despite counsel‘s 
lack of action, the Court held that David Washington received effective 
assistance of counsel according to the dictates of the Sixth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.
159
 
If the Strickland rule is unchanged, an honest reading of Strickland‘s facts 
requires that an appellate court grant no relief when a defense attorney takes 
the following combined actions before a capital sentencing hearing: (1) fails 
to investigate a defendant‘s family history; (2) fails to talk with a defendant‘s 
employers; (3) fails to consult a defendant‘s neighbors; (4) fails to request 
psychological experts or read his client‘s psychological report filed with the 
court; and (5) fails to request a presentence report.  In some ways, it is 
breathtaking how little counsel must do to comport with Sixth Amendment 
standards.  In part, the Court‘s willingness to bend over backwards and find 
that David Washington‘s attorney provided constitutionally sufficient 
representation may have confused lower courts‘ analyses of the issue. 
D.  The Court Retreats from Strickland? Indications that “Ineffective 
Assistance” May Mean Something 
While claiming adherence to the rule in Strickland—as all federal courts 
must lest they announce ―new law‖ in habeas cases—the Supreme Court has 
applied the rule in surprising ways, given the facts in the earlier case.
160
  In 
Williams v. Taylor,
161
 Wiggins v. Smith,
162
 and Rompilla v. Beard,
163
 the Court 
 
156. Id. at 672–73. 
157. Id.  The lower court noted that the trial attorney did not recall even reading the court-
ordered psychological report filed in the case.  Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 888–89 
(5th Cir. Unit B 1982).  
158. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). 
159. Id. at 698–99. 
160. Initially, the Court applied Strickland quite narrowly.  See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 
776, 788–92 (1987). 
161. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
162. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
163. 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
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demanded that trial counsel engage in far more robust investigation than had 
been required in Strickland.  In Williams, the Court remanded for resentencing 
because of counsel‘s inadequate preparation for the mitigation phase; the 
Court ruled that undiscovered evidence of child abuse and borderline mental 
retardation may have ―influenced the jury‘s appraisal of [the defendant‘s] 
moral culpability.‖164  In Wiggins, counsel, who did a great deal of 
investigation in the case, failed to pursue leads suggesting the defendant 
suffered from a history of abuse and neglect that may have diminished his 
moral culpability.
165
  The Court held that counsel‘s representation of Wiggins 
was therefore ineffective.
166
  In Rompilla, although counsel was far more 
diligent than the attorneys in either Williams or Wiggins, the Court found his 
representation ineffective.
167
  Rompilla‘s attorney spoke with five family 
members and employed three mental health experts; further, the defendant 
himself was decidedly unhelpful and sent the lawyer on false leads.
168
  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found the investigation inadequate and ruled 
that counsel needed to investigate everything relevant to the penalty phase, 
regardless of the accused‘s admissions or statements.169  As discussed below, 
federal circuit courts have proven willing to find ineffective assistance in 
cases where the Strickland Court presumably would not. 
VI.  CIRCUIT COURTS APPLYING STRICKLAND AFTER AEDPA 
As Professor Blume observes, few habeas petitioners are successful,
170
 
 
164. Williams, 529 U.S. at 398. 
165. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534–35. 
166. Id. at 535. 
167. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393. 
168. Id. at 381–82.  
169. Id. at 387.  The recent case of Schriro v. Landrigan points to a sea change among even the 
more conservative Justices on the Court.  550 U.S. 465 (2007).  In Landrigan, a 5–4 majority found 
that the reviewing district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a petitioner an 
evidentiary hearing on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel where the defendant had 
instructed counsel not to put on a mitigation case at all in the penalty phase of his capital sentencing 
trial.  Id. at 481.  In its discussion of the Ninth Circuit‘s decision, the majority signaled that it 
recognizes the Strickland–AEDPA combination is not merely an impenetrable loop.  Rather than 
relying merely on Strickland, and applying AEDPA to uphold the district court‘s decision, Justice 
Thomas found it necessary to underscore the novelty of the claim presented to the Court.  ―Indeed, 
we have never addressed a situation like this.‖  Id. at 478.  Justice Thomas‘s decision focused on the 
defendant‘s affirmative statements in open court directing counsel not to introduce mitigation 
evidence.  Id. at 478–80.  Thomas had to tailor his holding this narrowly because the case is 
otherwise indistinguishable from the ruling in Rompilla, where the defendant refused to assist in the 
development of a mitigation case.  Thomas‘s need to distinguish Rompilla (however weakly) to 
garner the five votes necessary to constitute the majority indicates that at least one person in that bloc 
recognizes that the law has changed significantly since Strickland‘s ―breathing standard‖ was 
announced as the law of the land. 
170. See Blume, supra note 11 at 284, and accompanying text.  Professor Blume calculates that 
0.62% of petitioners succeed.  Id.  
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and because so few writs are granted, there is no possibility of confirming a 
correlation, much less a cause, between a defendant‘s advancing particular 
sorts of arguments and the court‘s granting of the writ.  Nevertheless, trends 
emerge in which circuit courts either redefine or ignore the standards set out 
in Strickland to grant habeas relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Not all circuit courts have announced a robust standard that imposes 
higher standards on defense attorneys than did Strickland itself.
171
  Indeed, 
circuit courts have not been internally consistent in granting writs or 
remanding cases for evidentiary hearings.  Still, as the cases below 
demonstrate, the Strickland–AEDPA combination does not in itself prevent 
petitioners from prevailing in federal court. 
That said, surely some courts have acted as though a post-AEDPA 
challenge on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot prevail.  In 
Ward v. Dretke, the Fifth Circuit seemed convinced its hands were tied by 
AEDPA‘s restrictions.172  In Ward, Judge Higginbotham reviewed a district 
court‘s finding of ineffective representation at sentencing based on trial 
counsel‘s failure to object when the prosecutor quoted a Bible passage to 
condemn the petitioner.
173
  The court agreed that the state postconviction court 
unreasonably applied Strickland by not finding ineffective representation 
where the defense attorney did not object to this argument.
174
 The court 
further ruled that such an objection was necessary to mitigate the ―highly 
prejudicial effect‖ of the prosecutor‘s actions.175  Nevertheless, the court 
understood its duty as ―looking . . . through the prism of AEDPA deference,‖ 
which demanded that it not ―disturb the state habeas court‘s determination 
that Ward was not prejudiced.‖176  Even though the court believed that the 
state court‘s ruling was an objectively incorrect and ―unreasonable‖ statement 
of the law, it also believed AEDPA‘s deference standard compelled it to 
uphold the state court‘s finding on the merits.177  It appears the panel thought 
 
171. In fact, circuit courts have consistently ruled against habeas petitioners claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See, e.g., Lynn v. Bliden, 443 F.3d  238, 240 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Davis v. Greiner, 428 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2005); Allen v. Woodford, 366 F.3d 823, 828–29 (9th Cir. 
2004); Tucker v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 2003); Byram v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 203, 205  
(4th Cir. 2003); Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003); Riley v. Cockrell, 339 F.3d 
308, 311 (5th Cir. 2003).   
172. Ward v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 479, 499–500 (5th Cir. 2005).  
173. Id. at 497. 
174. Id.  In closing, the prosecutor quoted, ―‗But whosoever shall offend one of these little ones 
which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck and that he 
were drowned in the depth of the sea.‘‖  Id. at 496 (quoting Matthew 18:6 (New King James)).  The 
defendant had testified that he had turned to religion, and the prosecutor claimed his quotation 
constituted an invited response.  Id. at 497. 
175. Id.  
176. Id. at 500. 
177. Id. at 499–500. 
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AEDPA‘s restrictions could not be surmounted even when state courts 
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. 
Other courts have navigated ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
without departing from the Strickland test and likewise upholding AEDPA‘s 
deference requirements.  Brown v. Sternes
178
 reversed a district court opinion 
denying issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in a non-death penalty case where 
the defendant had been sentenced to thirty years‘ incarceration for armed 
robbery.
179
  The petitioner had previously been diagnosed with chronic 
schizophrenia by two different psychiatrists.
180
  Brown‘s court-appointed 
attorney failed to follow up on a subpoena for the petitioner‘s psychiatric 
records and also failed to advise court-appointed doctors that her client had a 
recent history of treatment for mental illness.
181
  She further neglected to 
inform stand-in counsel who tried the case for her that Brown had a history of 
mental illness.
182
  The Seventh Circuit panel found the trial attorney offered 
no credible explanation for why she abandoned any attempt to investigate her 
client‘s mental condition.183  Therefore, the court ruled her unexplained 
failures were deficient representation,
184
 and this deficiency prejudiced her 
client.
185
  The court found that the state court‘s conclusions were unreasonable 
based on the evidence in the case,
186
 and counsel‘s failure to act even when 
the client‘s previous attorney told her of his mental illness required that the 
court grant habeas relief.
187
 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit‘s Humphries v. Ozmint overturned the 
district court‘s dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus where it found 
that the court applied settled federal law unreasonably in failing to find 
counsel‘s representation ineffective.188  In Humphries, the prosecutor‘s 
closing argument during capital sentencing compared the respective worth of 
the defendant‘s life with that of the murder victim.189  This argument 
conflicted with Supreme Court precedent that prohibited a use of victim 
impact evidence ―that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial 
 
178. 304 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2002). 
179. Id. at 699.  
180. Id. at 681.  
181. Id. at 683.  
182. Id. at 684.  
183. Id. at 688.  
184. Id. at 696.  
185. Id. at 698.  
186. Id. at 691.   
187. Id. at 699. 
188. 366 F.3d 266, 276–77 (4th Cir. 2004). 
189. Id. at 270–71. 
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fundamentally unfair.‖190  The failure of Humphries‘s counsel to object to this 
line of argument fell ―below an objective standard of reasonableness,‖ and 
this failure prejudiced the defendant.
191
 
Although each of these cases overturned district court findings denying 
relief, Brown and Humphries rested squarely on the original holding of 
Strickland and broke no new legal ground.  Rather, the facts of these cases 
permitted rulings that left Strickland‘s holding intact while paying heed to 
AEDPA‘s deference standards.  The circuit courts provided common-sense 
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent and AEDPA. 
Nevertheless, circuit courts have gone further than merely upholding 
Strickland and deferring to AEDPA‘s provisions.  For example, AEDPA 
restricts granting evidentiary hearings to develop facts because state court 
findings on the merits are presumed correct unless the petitioner refutes these 
findings by clear and convincing evidence.
192
  Circuit courts have ignored this 
procedural hurdle and have remanded cases for hearings to determine the 
substance of ineffectiveness claims without ruling on the statutory 
presumption.
193
  In Eze v. Senkowski, the Second Circuit vacated the denial of 
a writ and remanded the case to the lower court to determine, inter alia, (1) 
why counsel failed to introduce relevant medical examinations that undercut 
the prosecution‘s chief witness, (2) why counsel did not call its own expert on 
injuries that may have been evidence of sexual assault, and (3) why counsel 
 
190. Id. at 272 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)). 
191. Id. at 276 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2006): 
(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus 
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a 
determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be 
correct.  The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of 
correctness by clear and convincing evidence.  
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in 
State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
claim unless the applicant shows that—  
(A) the claim relies on—  
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on  
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously  
unavailable; or  
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously  
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and  
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable 
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 
Id.   
193. Although no court relies explicitly on the constitutional basis of habeas corpus for 
ignoring the statute here, it may well be that courts are willing to sidestep niceties of procedure when 
they see constitutional matters at issue.  See supra Part IV.B. 
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failed to produce exculpatory evidence that was clearly available to him.
194
  
Although the court noted that the ineffectiveness of counsel claims regarding 
the expert witnesses were addressed on their merits by the district court,
195
 it 
never averred to the presumption language in § 2254(e) of AEDPA.  
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit vacated a denial of a writ and remanded to 
supplement the record and determine if counsel‘s failure to investigate three 
alibi witnesses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel for lack of 
investigation.
196
  The court found that the district court followed AEDPA in 
upholding the state court‘s finding that at least one alibi witness contacted the 
attorney before trial, and the attorney did not know of any other alibi 
witnesses before trial.
197
  However, the circuit court ordered findings on why 
counsel failed to investigate further after receiving a call from this alibi 
witness.
198
  Apparently this issue was also raised in the state court, but the 
district court did not address it.
199
  The Sixth Circuit remanded and ordered a 
hearing on these matters arguably addressed in the state court without ruling 
on the § 2254(e) presumption.
200
  Both the Second and Sixth Circuits alluded 
to insufficiencies in the record, but neither followed the dictates of the statute.  
By remanding for hearings without finding the presumption was overcome, 
the courts arguably violated the letter of the statute while upholding the spirit 
of constitutional due process. 
A broader ruling emerges in Dugas v. Coplan, where the First Circuit 
vacated the district court‘s denial of a petition for a writ.201  The court found 
that because counsel failed to consult an arson expert as part of his 
investigation, his representation was ineffective and prejudiced the 
defendant.
202
  The case was remanded to re-determine the question of 
prejudice that was never addressed by the state court, which failed to find 
deficient performance.
203
  The state court found that counsel‘s performance 
comported with Strickland and that he had properly weighed ―the benefits and 
perils of hiring an [arson] expert.‖204  By contrast, the district court found 
 
194. Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2003). 
195. Id. at 120.  The New York State Appellate Division ―did not discuss the merits of Eze‘s 
ineffective assistance claim.‖  Id. at 119.  
196. Bigelow v. Williams, 367 F.3d 562, 576 (6th Cir. 2004). 
197. Id. at 565.  
198. Id. at 576. 
199. Id. at 572.  ―Even though Bigelow raised this issue below and in state court, the district 
court did not address it . . . .‖  Id.  
200. See id. at 576. 
201. Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 342–43 (1st Cir. 2005). 
202. Id. at 341. 
203. Id. at 343. 
204. Id. at 326. 
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deficiency but no prejudice.
205
  The circuit court demanded an evidentiary 
hearing and found the state unreasonably applied Strickland.
206
  Again, there 
was no invocation of § 2254(e)‘s presumption. 
In addition to ignoring the presumptions required for ordering an 
evidentiary hearing, the First Circuit expanded counsel‘s duties beyond 
Strickland‘s requirements.207 The Dugas court found the defense attorney at 
fault for failing to hire an arson expert and investigating the case fully because 
the attorney evoked no ―reasonable professional judgments‖ that supported 
limiting his investigation.
208
  The defense‘s theory of the case did not question 
if the fire at issue was arson; rather, his defense was an identity defense, 
suggesting another perpetrator started the fire.
209
  The majority maintained 
that the attorney still needed to investigate the possibility that the fire was not 
caused by arson because it would offer an alternative ground for reasonable 
doubt.
210
  Essentially, the circuit court characterized Strickland as holding 
counsel ineffective for inadequately preparing a different theory of the case 
from the one counsel chose.
211
  This seems a stark contrast to the facts in 
Strickland, where counsel stopped preparation for capital sentencing because 
he was overcome by a feeling of ―hopelessness,‖ and yet his representation 
was sound under the Sixth Amendment.
212
  The facts in Dugas underscore 
how circuit courts see the law of ineffective assistance of counsel as 
demanding far more than was required in Justice O‘Connor‘s 1984 opinion. 
In particular, circuit court decisions have regularly challenged insufficient 
investigation by defense counsel, a factor the Strickland court deemed 
essentially unproblematic.
213
  In Frazier v. Huffman,
214
 the Sixth Circuit 
quoted Strickland for the proposition that ―‗strategic choices made after less 
than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 
 
205. Id. at 327. 
206. Id. at 334. 
207. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has changed the law on ineffective assistance 
of counsel in the cases following Strickland, see O‘Meara, supra note 148. 
208. Dugas, 428 F.3d at 327. 
209. Id. at 331.   
210. Id.  
211. Id. at 332. 
212. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 718 (1984).       
213. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.  In Strickland, the Court held that the 
same standards apply to counsel in both trial and capital sentencing hearings because the latter is 
―sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision.‖  
466 U.S. at 686–87.  Strickland addressed counsel‘s acts and omissions at the sentencing phase; by 
contrast, the failures to investigate addressed by the circuit courts here also involve trial matters.  I 
am not aware that courts have made a distinction between these two phases since Strickland, but this 
difference may account for the differences in analysis. 
214. 343 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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reasonable professional judgments support the limitations.‘‖215  The court then 
distinguished Strickland, finding that no ―reasonable attorney who saw the 
medical records indicating Frazier‘s brain injury would have declined to 
investigate the matter.‖216  The court also paid lip service to the lower court‘s 
finding on the merits, but the circuit court held the lower court‘s ruling to be 
an unreasonable conclusion based on the facts in the record.
217
  In Bell v. 
Miller, the Second Circuit granted a writ for ineffective assistance of counsel 
because the defense attorney failed to call an expert on the possible effects of 
trauma and drugs on an identifying witness, even though that witness testified 
that he suffered from memory loss.
218
  The court held that counsel‘s failure to 
investigate the scientific implications of a witness‘s trauma, blood loss, and 
sedation ―handicapped his cross-examination of those key prosecution 
witnesses.‖219  The court thus expanded the holding in Strickland by requiring 
effective counsel to research cumulative background information because it 
may assist in the cross-examination of a witness.
220
 
Even the Fourth Circuit in Gray v. Branker
221
 reversed the judgment of 
the district court to the extent that it denied the writ of habeas corpus to an 
inmate claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of 
his case.
222
  The circuit court found that the attorney failed to investigate and 
develop, for sentencing purposes, evidence that the defendant suffered from 
severe mental illness, and the court found it was reasonably probable that this 
failure prejudiced the outcome at sentencing.
223
  The court found ―Gray‘s 
counsel were confronted repeatedly with indications of Gray‘s mental 
impairment. . . .  [C]ounsel ignored these red flags and failed to 
investigate.‖224  The court held that a new sentencing was required.225 
 
215. Id. at 794 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91). 
216. Id. at 795. 
At a bare minimum, a reasonable attorney would have compared the records 
with the medical literature on brain damage, elicited information from Frazier 
himself about the injury and its effects on him, or presented the records on 
Frazier to someone who could competently evaluate them.  To do none of these 
things after seeing Frazier‘s medical records was unreasonable.   
Id.  Recall that Strickland‘s attorney could not recall if he read the competency report filed in that 
case for his client, and Strickland‘s representation was found to be effective.  Washington v. 
Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 888–89 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).  The difference between the results of the 
two cases could not be more striking.  
217. Frazier, 343 F.3d at 795–98. 
218. 500 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2007). 
219. Id. at 156. 
220. See id. at 156–57.  
221. 529 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2008).   
222. Id. at 242. 
223. Id. at 239–40. 
224. Id. at 229.  
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Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has granted petitions alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel where attorneys failed to investigate adequately.  
Recently, in Adams v. Quarterman, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district 
court‘s grant of habeas relief where the inmate was prejudiced by trial 
counsel‘s decision not to present mitigation evidence after making only 
cursory contact with the defendant‘s family over the defendant‘s objection.226  
The court held that counsel‘s failure to interview or present any witnesses 
during the punishment phase of petitioner‘s trial prevented the jury‘s learning 
of ―substantial evidence that might have influenced the jury to determine that 
mitigating factors required a sentence of life imprisonment rather than 
death.‖227  Petitioner‘s half-siblings would have testified to the physical abuse 
and deprivation Adams suffered as a child.
228
  Further, affidavits from 
psychologists indicated that the defendant suffered from ―bipolar disorder, 
alcohol and drug dependence, and a personality disorder with borderline and 
antisocial features.‖229  Even assuming that the inmate instructed counsel not 
to contact his family, counsel had a duty to seek out other mitigation.
230
  In the 
absence of significant investigation into an inmate‘s background, there would 
be no way for counsel to frame a strategy in the first place.
231
 
The Sixth Circuit‘s approach closely tracks the Fifth Circuit‘s approach.  
In Jells v. Mitchell, petitioner‘s application for a writ of habeas corpus on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel was denied.
232
  The court reversed 
the denial and remanded because of trial counsel‘s deficient performance.233  
 
225. Id. at 240.  
226. Adams v. Quarterman, 324 F. App‘x 340 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).   
227. Id. at 351, 356. 
228. Id. at 351.  ―Adams‘s foster mother, Linda Elliott, would have told the jury that when she 
first encountered Adams in his family‘s mobile home, he was two years old, and neither he nor his 
siblings had eaten in three or four days and did not know where their parents had gone.‖  Id.  
229. Id.  
230. Id. at 347.  In reaching this decision, the Fifth Circuit expressly disavowed a broad reading 
of Schriro v. Landrigan:   
[T]he state‘s reliance on Schriro v. Landrigan is misplaced.  There, the Supreme 
Court stated that if a defendant issues an instruction to counsel not to present 
any mitigating evidence, counsel‘s failure to investigate cannot constitute 
[ineffective assistance of counsel].  In contrast, the Supreme Court noted that 
Rompilla v. Beard presented a different situation, one in which ―the defendant 
refused to assist in the development of a mitigation case, but did not inform the 
court that he did not want mitigating evidence presented.‖  In the instant case, 
there is no evidence that Adams instructed counsel not to present mitigating 
evidence.   
Id. at 347 (footnotes omitted). 
231. Id. at 349. 
232. 538 F.3d 478, 484 (6th Cir. 2008). 
233. Id. at 494, 513.  
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In particular, counsel failed to prepare adequately for the mitigation phase of 
sentencing because he did not hire a mitigation specialist until the defendant 
was already convicted in the guilt phase.
234
  Second, he failed to provide to the 
mitigation specialist the defendant‘s personal history records that were 
required for the specialist to perform the requested psychological 
evaluation.
235
  Counsel never attempted to speak with ―many other family 
members who had lived with‖ the defendant and were available to testify.236 
Those few witnesses with whom counsel did speak were subject only to brief 
inquiries, and counsel failed to discover the defendant‘s history of extensive 
abuse in the home.
237
  Much of this evidence was readily available to counsel 
in the defendant‘s competency report, which counsel never consulted.238  On 
this final point, Justice O‘Connor‘s majority opinion in Strickland excised the 
fact found by lower courts that David Washington‘s trial counsel could not 
recall if he had ever read his client‘s competency report.239  By contrast, the 
Sixth Circuit named that exact same failure by counsel as proof that his 
representation was ineffective.
240
  Clearly, the circuit courts have gone beyond 
the Strickland rule. 
Not all Strickland challenges to investigation and preparation focus on the 
sentencing phase.  Circuit courts have granted the writ for trial errors as well.  
In Richards v. Quarterman, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court‘s 
granting of the writ of habeas corpus on the basis of ineffective assistance of 
counsel where a state inmate was sentenced to twenty-five years to life for 
murdering a homeless man.
241
  After ruling that the lower court offered proper 
deference to the state habeas court‘s decisions and rulings in accord with 
AEDPA,
242
 the district court found that counsel failed to present crucial 
exculpatory evidence related to a later attack on the victim involving multiple 
assailants other than the defendant, failed to interview three important 
witnesses before trial, failed to have an organized plan of defense, and failed 
to ―conduct Richards‘s defense in an acceptable manner.‖243  Moreover, the 
district court made specific findings that it found the defendant‘s attorney to 
 
234. Id. at 494. 
235. Id. at 493. 
236. Id.  
237. Id.   
238. Id.  
239. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 
879, 888–89 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 
240. Jells, 538 F.3d at 493–94. 
241. Richards v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 553, 558, 572 (5th Cir. 2009).  
242. Id. at 563.  
243. Id. at 561. 
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be less than candid in replying to the court‘s inquiries.244  The federal court 
found that the state courts unreasonably applied federal law.
245
 
Similarly, in Lindstadt v. Keane, another non-death penalty case, 
petitioner was convicted of sexual assault of his daughter, and the district 
court denied his application for a writ.
246
  After setting out the deferential 
standards in AEDPA, the Second Circuit considered four errors by counsel in 
the aggregate.
247
  First, counsel ignored that the dates of the offense charged 
were wrong because the defendant was not living in the family home at the 
time the charged offenses took place, thereby preventing the defendant from 
offering ―something akin to an alibi‖ defense.248  Second, counsel failed to 
object to the explanation for the victim‘s injuries.249  The state‘s medical 
expert relied on vaguely identified studies to claim that the girl‘s injuries were 
caused solely by sexual contact.
250
  The defense never requested these studies, 
and the prosecution was unable to produce them for postconviction 
proceedings.
251
  By contrast, petitioner‘s appellate counsel was able to find a 
number of contemporaneous studies that cast doubt on the linkage between 
the victim‘s injuries and sexual abuse.252  Third, in his opening statement, 
counsel stated that his client would testify only if the prosecution had made its 
case.
253
  Therefore, when the defendant did testify, counsel essentially 
conceded that the prosecution had proved its case.
254
  Finally, defense counsel 
failed to make an obvious point that the defendant‘s wife wanted him jailed 
and had complained to his probation officers on a number of prior 
occasions.
255
  The court held that, ―[t]aken together, ineffectiveness permeated 
 
244. Id. at 566.  The circuit court decision quotes the district court at some length concerning 
the testimony of the petitioner‘s trial counsel, Davis:   
―Apparently recognizing the significance of Davis‘s failure to present this 
exculpatory evidence, or even to allow it to be presented when the prosecutor 
attempted to do so, Davis strived at the July 21–22 hearing to create the 
appearance of a strategic reason why she kept the exculpatory evidence from the 
jury.  In the process, Davis has engaged in what might best be described as legal 
prestidigitation.‖ 
Id. (quoting Richards v. Quartermann, 578 F. Supp. 2d 849, 860 (N.D. Tex. 2008)).   
245. Id. at 568.  
246. Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir. 2001). 
247. Id. at 199–203. 
248. Id. at 200. 
249. Id. at 201. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 202. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 203. 
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all the evidence.‖256  The court found that in the face of ―underwhelming 
evidence,‖ counsel‘s deficiencies prejudiced his client.257 
The Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Moore v. Czerniak found trial error so 
serious that it reversed and remanded a district court‘s denial of the writ.258  In 
Moore, defense counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his client‘s taped 
confession.
259
  Counsel mistakenly believed that his client was not in custody 
when he requested an attorney before interrogation.
260
  Further, the fact that 
the defendant made similar statements to third parties about the crime did not 
render counsel‘s error harmless because suppressing the taped statement given 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment would have placed the defendant in a 
far better position to negotiate a plea bargain.
261
  Counsel‘s failure prejudiced 
the defendant.
262
  The court found that counsel failed to object because he 
misunderstood the law and for no strategic reason.
263
  Rather than indulging 
Strickland‘s presumption of effectiveness, the circuit courts seem willing to 
recognize poor trial work and grant petitioners relief. 
Two final decisions arising from the same state case demonstrate that 
whatever else can be said about the application of Strickland after AEDPA, 
the law continues to confuse the courts.  Alexandre Mirzayance confessed to 
the brutal murder of his cousin whom he stabbed nine times and shot four 
times.
264
  He pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
265
  In 
California, such a plea requires a bifurcated trial consisting of (1) a guilt phase 
wherein the state bears the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
and (2) an insanity phase in which the defense will bear the burden of proving 
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
266
  Specifically, to establish the 
defense under California law, the defendant needed to prove that he ―was 
incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his . . . act  
and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the 
offense.‖267  The same jury would hear the evidence in both trial phases of the 
trial.
268
 
 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 205.  
258. Moore v. Czerniak, 534 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2008). 
259. Id. at 1137. 
260. Id. at 1138.  
261. Id. at 1140.  
262. Id. at 1148–49. 
263. Id. at 1130.  
264. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1415 (2009). 
265. Id.  
266. Id.  
267. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (West 1985). 
268. See Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1416. 
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Mirzayance‘s counsel tried to persuade a jury in the guilt phase that, 
because of his client‘s mental illness, he was unable to kill with 
premeditation.
269
  The jury rejected that argument and convicted him of first-
degree murder.
270
  The insanity phase was set to begin on the following day.
271
  
Counsel then advised Mirzayance to withdraw his not guilty by reason of 
insanity plea (NGI), and the defendant did so.
272
  After conviction, 
Mirzayance claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney‘s 
recommendation deprived him of his only viable defense.
273
  The state 
appellate court rejected this claim without giving a reason.
274
 
In the ensuing habeas hearing, counsel testified that he recommended 
withdrawal of the NGI plea ―out of a sense of hopelessness,‖ basing his 
decision on two factors.
275
  Counsel explained that he did not believe that a 
jury that found premeditation would find insanity, and he was angry because 
the defendant‘s parents declined to testify at sentencing.276  Specifically, 
counsel testified that he was so angry at Mirzayance‘s parents that he was not 
sure if ―[he] became so emotional that [he] lost [his] sense of advocacy.‖277  
Further, counsel did not seem to clearly distinguish between the standards 
required for premeditation and insanity and did not think a jury would find 
premeditation and rule in favor of an insanity defense.
278
  Finally, counsel 
thought the judge was sympathetic to his client and ―would sentence him to a 
psychiatric prison, but would sentence more harshly if the jury found him 
sane.‖279  The Ninth Circuit found the attorney‘s ―advice to . . . withdraw the 
insanity plea ‗fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,‘ and 
therefore constitute[d] deficient performance.‖280  The court thought he made 
his decision rashly and based on speculation.
281
  Because a reasonable 
probability existed that but for the attorney‘s advice, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different, the court found prejudice and affirmed 
the district court‘s grant of habeas relief, though on different grounds.282 
By contrast, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions 
 
269. Id. at 1415.   
270. Id.  
271. Id.  
272. Id.  
273. Id. 
274. Id.  
275. Mirzayance v. Knowles, 175 F. App‘x 142, 143 (9th Cir. 2006).   
276. Id. 
277. Id. at 144.  
278. Id. 
279. Id.  
280. Id. at 143 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).  
281. Id. at 144.  
282. Id. at 145.  
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to deny the petition.
283
  In reaching this decision, the Court for the first time 
characterized the rule in Strickland as a ―general standard‖ that gives the state 
court more latitude reasonably to determine if a defendant has failed to satisfy 
that standard.
284
  Therefore, the federal courts are supposed to follow a 
―doubly deferential‖ judicial review in determining whether state decisions 
are not simply incorrect but ―unreasonable—a substantially higher 
threshold.‖285  The Court then held that the state court‘s determination was not 
unreasonable when it concluded that Mirzayance‘s attorney was not deficient 
when he counseled his client to abandon his insanity plea in the brutal slaying 
of his cousin.
286
  The Court said the defense stood almost no chance of 
success, and the Court does not require defense counsel to pursue every claim 
or defense, no matter how unrealistic.
287
 
The Court then, in dicta, reasoned that even if Mirzayance‘s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim were subject to a de novo review, it would still 
fail.
288
  The Court thought counsel made a strategic choice not to adopt a 
losing strategy.
289
  Although the Court accused the circuit court of engaging in 
fact-finding and overturning the lower court‘s factual findings without 
mentioning the ―clearly erroneous‖ standard,290 the Court never quoted the 
attorney‘s testimony that ―[he] became so emotional that [he] lost [his] sense 
of advocacy.‖291  If two courts are this far apart on one factually 
uncomplicated case, it is difficult to say precisely the state of settled federal 
law on ineffective assistance of counsel after AEDPA. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
My title derives from a common enough experience for anyone who has 
asked for directions in New England.  After admitting that one is lost and 
needs to find the way to a lane in Marblehead, one finds a local New England 
guide.  Invariably, the guide will pause, purse his lips, and then pronounce, 
―You can‘t get there from here.‖  This could indicate any number of 
possibilities.  The hearer could conjure up ideas of a time and space rift that 
separates his destination from him for all time.  On a less metaphysical plane, 
the answer could indicate that the guide feels inadequate to the task of laying 
out with precision the intricate maneuvers that must be accomplished to travel 
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two miles as the crow flies.  Or it could mean that even if the guide could give 
the directions with precision, his assessment of the hearer is unflattering at 
best.  In any of the above scenarios, the same conclusion follows: ―You can‘t 
get there from here.‖ 
The common wisdom among many defense attorneys is that one cannot 
prevail in a habeas claim after AEDPA.  This Article has attempted to debunk 
that idea in cases where the petitioner raises a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  Circuit courts seem willing in some instances to rethink case law 
and sidestep some of AEDPA‘s restrictions to review the merits of the cases 
before them.  Because the law in this area remains confusing, it seems that 
courts are more likely to continue disagreement rather than converge on one 
approach.  In short, maybe you can get there from here. 
On a broader level, it may be time to question whether AEDPA‘s 
restrictions on habeas review serve the common good.  Reducing access to 
courts to increase efficiency and grant finality to lower court decisions is not a 
sufficient reason for permitting those without resources to suffer the added 
indignity of an ineffective attorney.  How the judicial system treats those 
accused of crimes, and those perhaps wrongfully convicted, says something 
about those of us who work in that system.  Are we satisfied that the lines 
restricting access have been drawn in the right places? 
 
